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Abstract 
 
 
Large numbers of part-time workers around the world, both those 
who choose to be part-time and those who are there involuntarily 
and would prefer a full-time job report they want more hours.  Full-
timers who say they want to change their hours mostly say they want 
to reduce them.  When recession hit in most countries the number of 
hours of those who said they wanted more hours, rose sharply and 
there was a fall in the number of hours that full-timers wanted their 
hours reduced by.  Even though the unemployment rate has returned 
to its pre-recession levels in many advanced countries, 
underemployment in most has not. 
 
We produce estimates for a new, and better, underemployment rate 
for twenty-five European countries.  In most underemployment 
remains elevated.  We provide evidence for the UK and the US as 
well as some international evidence that underemployment rather 
than unemployment lowers pay in the years after the Great 
Recession.  We also find evidence for the US that falls in the home 
ownership rate have helped to keep wage pressure in check.  
Underemployment replaces unemployment as the main influence on 
wages in the years since the Great Recession.   
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Underemployment implies workers are not on their labor supply curves, in contrast to the 
so-called “canonical” model (Pencavel, 1986) which suggests workers are free to choose 
their hours of work, given the wage rate and so are on their labor supply curves.  More 
recently Pencavel (2016, 2018) acknowledges that this model, where workers are free to 
select their hours, dominant in the literature since Lewis (1957), neglects the role of 
employer preferences in hours determination.  Even though Lewis himself stepped back 
from this position (Lewis 1969), acknowledging that the preferences of employers are 
neglected in the canonical model, the assumptions that workers select from a continuum of 
hours, while treating the wage rate as exogenous, continues to dominate research and 
teaching. This approach persists, even though aggregate hours fluctuate in response to 
changes in demand and the organization of production requires employers to place some 
restrictions on working time (for example, to ensure that a production line is fully staffed). 
 
Some authors, acknowledging that observed hours and wage combinations reflect both 
supply and demand influences, have sought to identify these effects empirically. Thus 
Feldstein (1968) and Rosen (1969) attempt to identify the supply and demand for worker 
hours using industry variation, with limited success.  Further, Hwang, Mortensen and Reid 
(1998) argue that search behavior further complicates the analysis of how workers select 
between different combinations of wages and nonwage job amenities (such as hours of 
leisure).  They suggest that “the equilibrium relationship between wages and a nonwage 
job amenity will generally bear little resemblance to workers’ underlying valuations of the 
job amenity” This argument is consistent with a situation where workers’ valuations of 
leisure are not aligned to their contracted hours of work and they therefore might express 
a wish to change their working time. 
 
These arguments are reinforced by the employment function literature which focuses on 
how firms adjust to a positive output shock, which dates back to the 1960s and 1970s.1  
Hart and Sharot (1978), for example, argued that their results “hinge on the proposition 
that firms achieve short-run changes in labor requirements by varying their worker 
utilization rates, whereas… the response of employment is more sluggish and long-term.”  
Of course, the same applies to a negative shock.    
  
Hart (2017) has noted that the peak to trough percentage change in hours in the Great 
Recession was greater than in employment.  GDP fell in the UK by 6.3% and by 6.6%, 
peak to trough in Germany.  He notes that employment in the UK fell by a relatively modest 
2.3%, while person-hours changed more, with a 4.3% drop.  Germany’s fall in employment 
was a trivial 0.5%, while that of person-hours was a much larger 3.4%.  The US GDP drop 
was not quite as severe, at 4.1% but employment and person-hours reductions were 
considerably greater, at 5.6% and 7.6%, respectively.  The three countries experienced a 
fall from peak person-hours that preceded that of employment by at least one quarter.    
  
A key element of Hart’s analysis is the relative costs of varying hours and employment. 
Where hiring, firing and training costs are high, employers are more likely to rely on the 
internal labor market.  Where they are low, there is likely to be more job turnover, implying 
                                                 
1 Brechling (1965); Ball and St Cyr (1966) and Hart and Sharot (1978). 
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greater reliance on the external labor market.  This does not seem much like employees 
selecting a utility maximizing combination of the real wage and leisure: rather it suggests 
that firm profitability (or survival) is taking precedence over worker’s hours preferences, 
at least in the short-run.  Short-run hours variations may be the best way to protect joint 
investment in firm specific skills.  
 
Lundberg (1985) suggests that hours and wages are jointly determined.  The offered wage 
is positively related to hours worked, though the offer locus is very flat.  Her principal 
conclusion is that labor supply equations cannot properly be estimated in isolation from 
the process generating wages, even when long time series are available on a sample of 
individuals.  These findings also undermine the assumption that observed combinations of 
income and hours reflect workers’ preferences. 
 
If employment contracts are non-binding with workers being free to leave and firms to fire 
at will, Stole and Zweibel (1996) show that the optimal number of workers exceeds the 
number implied by the neoclassical profit maximizing model. This resulting 
“overemployment” leads to downward pressure on the internal wage, bringing it closer to 
the outside option.  Utility maximizing workers in such firms may choose to accept hours 
wages packages that do not meet their income aspirations and be prepared to work 
additional hours in the same job without increased wages, especially if monopsonistic 
considerations limit their outside opportunities.  
 
Another argument relates to the effects of monopsony on hours toutcomes. If employers 
are monopsonistic, they may be able to vary workers’ hours in response to fluctuations in 
demand even if there is little joint investment in firm-specific skills (see Ashenfelter et al 
(2010)), Manning (2003) and Card et al, (2018)). Hours variations are invariably less 
expensive than rescaling the workforce and firms may use such variations when they 
perceive the probability of inefficient separations is low.  Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002), 
suggest a number explanations as to why modern labor markets are typically 'thin', 
increasing employers’ market power.   
 
Manning, while also lamenting the pre-eminence of the canonical model, argues that under 
monopsony, utility maximizing employees may be displaced from their supply curve and 
might express a desire to increase or decrease their current hours at the current wage rate 
(Manning, 2003, p. 228). Using data from the British Household Panel Survey for the 
period 1991-98, he shows that the desire to reduce hours substantially exceeded desired 
hours increases during this period.  This finding is consistent with our analysis using the 
UK LFS for the early part of the following decade, but we find a subsequent reversal after 
the Great Recession.   
 
Depew and Sørenson (2013) examined job duration data for the US from 1919 to 1940 and 
found that monopsony power is larger in slack labor markets.  Recently Hirsch et al (2018) 
found the same using German administrative data from 1985 to 2010 that firms possess 
more monopsony power in recessions. 
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One consequence may be that workers are forced to agree contracts which give employers 
rights to vary working time at short-notice without varying pay rates.  Azar et al (2017) 
shown that labor market concentration is high in the US, and increased concentration is 
associated with lower wages such that there is a negative correlation between labor market 
concentration and average posted wages in that market.  Using data from the employment 
website CareerBuilder.com, they calculate labor market concentration for over 8,000 
geographic-occupational labor markets in the US.  The authors show that going from the 
25th percentile to the 75th percentile in concentration is associated with a 15-25% decline 
in posted wages, suggesting that concentration increases labor market power.   
 
Another version of this argument has been proposed by an editor who argued that a firm 
might have some fully employed workers and some underemployed workers.  The latter 
group may be thought of as a reserve army, enabling the firm to resist wage demands from 
the fully employed.  The very existence of underemployed workers working alongside 
those who are satisfied with their hours may exert more downward pressure on wages than 
the level of local unemployment. As replacements for the fully employed within a firm, the 
underemployed have lower costs and risks than do the pool of unemployed workers from 
which the firm might draw.  Employers are likely aware who the underemployed are and 
that they are willing to work longer hours at current or reduced wage rates.  
Underemployment is personal in a way that unemployment is not.    
 
We now extend our earlier work in which we constructed an underemployment rate in 
hours space for the UK, by constructing similar underemployment measures for twenty-
five other European countries.  We show that at the time of writing, in contrast to the 
unemployment rate, underemployment in most countries has not returned to its pre-
recession levels.  The main exception is Germany.  We also show why it is not possible to 
construct a comparable comprehensive measure of underemployment for the United States. 
Instead, it is only possible to build a measure based on survey responses to questions about 
part-time working and whether the worker would prefer to be full-time.  However, we do 
show that in the post-recession years, this measure has a significantly negative effect on 
US wages, while the unemployment rate is insignificant.  We also show there is a low 
prevalence of part-time work in the US, which suggests that this measure may well 
understate the true amount of underemployment.  In our view, elevated levels of 
underemployment rates are a large part of the reason why wage growth has been so weak 
in the US post-recession.  This is consistent with our recent work for the UK showing the 
same role for underemployment (Bell and Blanchflower, 2018a). 
 
We find that in Europe large numbers of workers would like to change the number of hours 
they work without changing their wage rate.  Those who wished to increase their hours (the 
underemployed) rose sharply in the years after 2008, while the number who wished to 
reduce their hours (the overemployed) fell slightly.  During the recovery, over-employment 
fell back to pre-recession levels, but underemployment did not.  The evidence in Bell and 
Blanchflower (2018b) is that such individuals, including those who want fewer hours (the 
over-employed) and those who want more hours (the underemployed) have lower levels of 
well-being.  We also found for the UK that those who want to reduce their hours are paid 
a compensating differential via higher earnings, while those who want more hours are paid 
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less.  If aggregate demand was higher, our data suggests that more wage-hour combinations 
would be available that include extra hours, which is likely to improve welfare and well-
being.  Low demand reduces the availability of such choices and generates 
underemployment. 
 
Existing Measures of Underemployment  
The most widely available measure of underemployment estimated by statistical agencies 
around the world, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the US; the Office for National 
Statistics in the UK and the EU statistical agency Eurostat, is the share of involuntary part-
time workers in total employment – the involuntary part-time rate (IPTR).  This measure 
only captures the number of part-time workers that wish to extend their hours. It carries no 
information on the number of additional hours these workers wish to work, nor if some 
(other) workers, including voluntary part-timers and full-timers, would prefer to reduce 
their hours.  Further, since the share of part-time workers in the workforce varies by country 
for fiscal, institutional and cultural reasons, the possible range for the estimate of the share 
of involuntary part-timers expressed as a share of total employment varies widely across 
countries.  This makes cross-country comparisons of involuntary part-time rates 
problematic.  
  
However, the widespread use of this measure of underemployment reflects the lack of 
alternatives, particularly in the USA.  In Europe, involuntary part-timers are described as 
part-timers who want full-time jobs (PTWFT), whereas in the United States they are 
described as part-time for economic reasons (PTFER).  In Europe, statistics on PTWFT are 
obtained from the individual level European Labor Force Surveys (EULFS) and in the 
United States on PTFER from the Current Population Survey.  We treat these measures 
analogously.  Monthly data on these measures are published for the US and the UK, while 
quarterly data is available for most European countries.  
  
There is a growing literature on their behavior.2  Blanchflower and Levin (2015) showed 
that in the United States, its rise represents another dimension of labor underutilization.  
Valetta et al (2018) report that the young of both sexes under the age of twenty-four, the 
single, the least educated, blacks and Hispanics and the unincorporated self-employed are 
most likely to be IPT.  Hurley and Patrini (2017) reported on the distribution of involuntary 
part-time work across the EU28 in 2015.  They were disproportionately female, young, less 
educated, on temporary contracts and in elementary occupations.    
  
There are composition effects by adding more involuntary part-time workers because they 
suffer a wage penalty.  Golden (2106) for the United States found that among those who 
are paid by the hour, voluntary part-time workers earned $15.61 per hour on average 
compared with only $15.11 for those working part-time involuntarily.  Among those who 
could “find only part time work” their hourly earnings were even lower, $14.53.   
 
                                                 
2 For other recent papers on underemployment see Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2016, 2018), Cajner et al 
(2014); Glauber (2017); Golden (2016); Sum and Khatiwada (2010) and Veliziotis et al (2015). 
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In Bell and Blanchflower (2018a), using UKLFS data, we found that individuals who 
reported that they wanted more hours, over and above whether they were PTWFT, had 
lower wages.  Individuals who were PTWFT had lower hourly wages than voluntary part-
timers and full-timers.  This implies that wages will be depressed the greater is the willingness 
of workers to provide more hours at the going wage rate.  Part-timers who want extra hours are 
paid less than part-timers who are content with their hours. It seems that having workers in 
jobs where they want more hours keeps wages down as they accept lower pay, conditional on 
their characteristics.  Underemployment impacts wages.  
 
The Great Recession and its Aftermath 
By the start of the Great Recession in December 2007 in the US and April 2008 in the UK, 
involuntary part-time employment was above its previous minimum, both in levels and 
rates.  The latest data for the United States for July 2018 from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, reports that there are 4,567,000 PTFER, down from a high of 9.25 million in 
September 2010, representing 2.9% of total employment now compared with 6.4% at the 
peak.  This compares to a low of 3.1 million or 2.3% of employment in July 2000 and 2.7% 
in April 2006.   
 
PTWFT in the UK in the latest data was 991,000 in April 2018, down from a peak of 
1,465,000 in April 2013 and up from the pre-recession level in April 2008 of 696,000.  As 
a percentage of employment in the UK PTWFT now also represents 3.1% of total 
employment compared with a peak rate of 4.9% and a low of 1.9% in the last three months 
of 2004.    
 
Chart 1 plots the monthly time series of three measures of labor utilization for the United 
States – the unemployment rate U3, the broader measure U6, which is only available back 
to 1994 and what we call U7, which expresses PTFER in the United States as a proportion 
of employment.  U3 and U7 are plotted back to 1955 while U6 starts in 1994.  U6 peaked 
at around 17.1% at the end of 2009 and in the latest data for July 2018 it had returned to its 
pre-recession level of 7.5%.  U3 had also returned to a pre-recession low of 3.9%.  In 
January 2008 at the start of the recession U3 was 5.0%; U6 was 9.2% and U7 was 3.0%.   
 
The rise in involuntary part-time employment has occurred at the same time as there has 
been little change in average hours worked in both the US and the UK.  In the US, private 
sector average weekly hours, according to the BLS was 34.4 in January 2008 versus 34.5 
in March 2018.  For production and non-supervisory workers, it was unchanged at 37.7 on 
both dates.  In the UK, for example, average actual hours at the start of the recession in 
March to May 2008 was 37.1 for full-timers and 15.6 for part-timers.  This compares to 
37.3 and 16.2 respectively for November 2017 to January 2018.  Overall average actual 
hours went from 32.0 to 32.1.  In Germany, average hours declined slightly from 35.6 to 
35.2.  Usual weekly hours fell in the European Union, according to Eurostat from 37.9 in 
2008 to 37.1 in 2016.   
  
The numbers of involuntary part-timers are large as compared, for example, to the number 
of unemployed people, which in the latest data for the US in July 2018 is 6.3 million while 
in the UK in December-February 2018 there are 1.5 million unemployed.  At the same time 
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there were 991,000 PTWFT in the UK, down from just under one and a half million at the 
peak.  So, the additional level of labor market underutilization they represent is substantial.    
  
According to Eurostat, in 2016, there were 9.5 million PTWFT part-time workers ages 15-
74 in the EU-28 of which 6.9 million were in the Euro area.  This compares with 17.6 
million unemployed in the EU28 and 13.9 million in the Euro Area.  In four countries in 
2016 – Germany (1.44 million); Spain (1.4 million); France (1.6 million) and the UK (1.6 
million) there were more than a million PTWFT.  Between 2008 and 2013, which is the 
peak year, the numbers rose in almost every country, the main exceptions being Germany; 
Croatia and Norway.    
  
In several A10 East European countries, which had large outward migration flows 
especially to the UK – Bulgaria; Romania; Poland, Lithuania and Latvia - the numbers in 
2016 were little different from those in 2008.  If you wanted more hours and you lived in 
an A10 Accession country, you moved westwards, especially to the UK.  In 2016 among 
advanced countries the numbers were still above 2008 levels everywhere except Germany, 
Norway and Sweden.  It is notable that there were very large spikes in the Netherlands, 
from 97k to 510k; in Belgium from 37k to 162k; in Spain from 84k to 1413k and in Greece 
from 99k to 268k.  The 2016 numbers were markedly above 2008 numbers in Belgium; 
Denmark; Greece; Spain; France; Austria; Portugal and the UK.  
  
Table 1 reports IPTR rates, expressed as a proportion of total employment for the European 
Union.  Rates spiked as high as 8.1% in Ireland and 7.9% in Spain in 2013.  Of note is the 
rise in the Netherlands to 7.3% in 2014 and to 9% in Cyprus in 2016.  Rates were higher 
than the 2008 pre-recession rate –in part because of a fall in total employment in some 
countries - in all countries except Germany, Malta, Norway, Sweden and Turkey.  IPTR of 
6.7% in low unemployment Switzerland are notably high.  Table 1 also reports the ILO 
unemployment rates by country which mostly shows how the two series rose through 2012 
and declined thereafter.   
 
Countries with high unemployment rates like Cyprus, Spain and Greece even in 2016 have 
high IPTR whereas Italy and Portugal had relatively low IPTRs given their unemployment 
rates exceeded 10%.  The Netherlands and Finland have noticeably high PTERs in 2016.  
Several East European countries have very low rates.  Some of these contrasts reflect 
structural differences in national labor markets, for example through differences in part-
time working, discussed below.  These differences in the proportion of part-time rates 
obviously constrain possible variation in PTER rates, without necessarily reflecting 
differences in labor market slack.  
  
The Bell/Blanchflower Underemployment Measures 
In Bell and Blanchflower (2011, 2013, 2014, 2018a 2018b, 2018c), using data from the 
UK Labour Force Survey (UKLFS), we showed that measuring underemployment using 
the number of part-time workers who want full-time jobs does not fully capture the extent 
of worker dissatisfaction with currently contracted hours.  This is due to its focus on a 
particular group of workers - involuntary part-timers - rather than all workers.  It turns out 
that over the Great Recession years and subsequently, not only do part-timers who say they 
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would prefer full-time jobs appear to be underemployed, but so also do part-timers who 
wish to remain part-time and full-timers 3 .  We also examine the phenomenon of 
overemployment, as some workers report that they want to work fewer hours.  In Bell and 
Blanchflower (2018c), we showed that both the underemployed and the unemployed in the 
UK had relatively low levels of well-being.  In the case of the underemployed there was 
evidence that in the post-recession years there was a marked rise in the probability that they 
report being depressed.  
  
In the UKLFS, workers report whether they would like to change their hours at the going 
wage rate and how many extra or fewer hours they would like to work.  A desired hours 
variable can thus be constructed for each individual.  It is set to zero for workers who are 
content with their current hours. It is negative for those who wish to reduce their hours (the 
overemployed) and positive for those who want more hours (the underemployed).   
Equivalent questions are asked in the European Labor Force surveys which currently cover 
twenty-five countries including three non-EU countries – Switzerland, Iceland and Norway 
– plus the UK.4  We do not have micro data on Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia or the Czech 
Republic.  None of the major US surveys regularly asks workers whether they wish to 
increase or decrease their hours.  Hence the calculations that we report below are not 
available for the United States.5  
  
In Bell and Blanchflower (2013), we defined an underemployment rate using the UKLFS.  
Our measure is more general than the unemployment rate because it reflects the willingness 
of workers to vary their hours at the current pay rate – either underemployment or 
overemployment.  For any given unemployment rate, a higher underemployment rate 
implies that reductions in unemployment will be more difficult to achieve because existing 
workers are seeking more hours — there is excess capacity in the internal labor market.    
  
                                                 
3 With the UK LFS, full-time part-time status is self-defined. Analysis of the 2006 data suggest that 90% of 
those that describe themselves as part-time work between 5 and 32 hours per week, while 90% of those who 
describe themselves as full-time worked between 34 and 60 hours per week. (Walling, 2007) 
 
4 There is an issue with holes in the data the ONS provides for the UK to the EULFS, so we make use of the 
original data from the UK Labor Force Surveys.  They do not provide data on those who want less hours but 
only those who want more which means we cannot use these data to calculate our index. 
 
5 Golden and Gebreselassie (2007) documented that in the United States the preferences for workers having 
more or fewer hours remained virtually unchanged between 1985 and 2001.  They examined data on 
underemployment and overemployment from the 2001 May Supplements of the Current Population Survey 
and compared the findings with the results in Shank (1986), who used the 1985 May Supplement.  They 
found that 7.0% of the employed were overemployed in 2001 compared with 7.6% in 1985 while 27.5% were 
underemployed in both years.  Here overemployment and underemployment are defined in response to the 
question "If you had a choice would you prefer to work fewer hours and earn less money; work more hours 
but earn more money or work the same number of hours and earn the same money?" This definition is much 
more expansive than the one we use as it covers both voluntary and involuntary part-timers and full-timers.   
In contrast to their findings part-time for economic reasons (PTER) as a proportion of employment were not 
the same in May 1985 (=5828/106932=5.5%) as it was in May 2001 (=3439/137092=2.5%).  This does 
suggest that other workers other than involuntary part-timers want to change their hours. 
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The key insight of our index is to define the underemployment rate in hours rather than 
people space.  To demonstrate this, we multiply each argument of the unemployment rate 
by a constant number of hours.  Setting these at h , average hours worked by the 
employed6, the unemployment rate is shown in Equation 1 where the product of average 
hours worked, and employment is, by definition, equal to aggregate hours worked, where 
there are N employed workers.  
  
 
N
i
i
U Uh Uh
u
U E Uh Eh
Uh h
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 

  (1)  
The next step is to add the intensive margin of the labor market.  Preferences over hours 
are not realized for all workers.  Some say they want more hours: others would prefer to 
work fewer hours.  We incorporate these preferences in our index. Thus, the sum of 
preferred additional hours is given by U
k
k
h , where the index k is defined over all workers 
who wish more hours. In aggregate, the preferred reduction in hours is given by
O
j
j
h , 
where the index j is defined over all workers who wish fewer hours.  We assume that market 
imperfections, transactions costs and sectoral and geographical differences in the 
distribution of underemployment and overemployment prevent mutually beneficial 
exchanges of working time between these groups.  The net effect of the desired changes in 
hours is then added to the numerator of Equation 1 to complete the underemployment rate, 
uV, which is given in Equation 2.  
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       (2)  
If the desired increase in hours equals the desired reduction in hours, then uV simply 
reproduces the unemployment rate.  Excess capacity in the labor market is only influenced 
by the extensive margin.  But uV will differ from the unemployment rate if there is excess 
supply (or excess demand) of hours on the internal labor market.  The underemployment 
rate could be greater, or less, than the unemployment rate.  For example, it is lower than 
the unemployment rate when, in aggregate, desired hours reductions exceed desired hours 
increases. Note that the index is not affected by increases and reductions in desired hours 
of equal magnitude, though this might be taken as an indicator of increased mismatch 
between employers’ job offers and workers’ hours preferences.  
 
                                                 
6 We justify this assumption on the basis of prediction of hours worked by the unemployed conditional on 
their characteristics. These predictions do not differ significantly from mean hours worked by the employed. 
The estimates derive from hours of work functions estimated for the employed. These clearly do not take 
account of unobserved differences between the employed and unemployed.  Details available in the online 
appendix.     
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To clarify, the denominator is the product of unemployment with the average hours of the 
currently employed plus the number of hours worked by employed individuals. The 
numerator is the total number of “unemployed” hours plus the extra hours the some of the 
employed would like to work minus the reduction in hours desired among the set of 
employees who wish to work less. For any given unemployment rate, an underemployment 
rate of greater magnitude implies that reductions in unemployment will be more difficult 
to achieve because there are existing workers who are willing to more hours without any 
increase in pay rates. There is therefore excess capacity on both the external and the internal 
labor markets.   
 
If the underemployment rate is high relative to the unemployment rate and there is an 
upturn in demand, cost-minimizing producers will offer existing workers longer hours at 
the same wage, so avoiding recruitment costs and the costs of uncertainty associated with 
new hires.  Thus, the unemployment rate will not fall so rapidly when the 
underemployment rate is high and there will be less upward pressure on wages. And the 
unemployment rate will not fall so rapidly in a recovery if the underemployment rate is 
relatively high at the start of the recovery since cost-minimizing employers will offer 
existing workers more hours in the first instance.  This is what may have happened in the 
1980s in the US and in the post Great Recession period.    
 
By taking account of both the intensive and extensive margins, our index gives a more 
complete picture of excess demand or excess supply in the labor market than the 
unemployment rate alone.  It is therefore potentially superior to the unemployment rate as 
a means of calibrating the output gap.  
  
Measuring Underemployment in the European Union  
In this section we describe estimates of the Bell-Blanchflower index of underemployment 
using individual data for twenty-six countries from the annual EULFS.  We use the same 
approach as in our earlier work for the UK.  We calculate estimates from 2000 to 2016 on 
hours preferences, although there are some gaps by country.  We have concerns about the 
accuracy of the data in the early years for some countries, due to smaller sample sizes and 
inconsistencies in the questions asked.  Respondents to the EULFS are asked how many 
hours they would like to work in total at the going wage, as well as the number of hours 
actually worked during the reference week.  The difference between these provides an 
estimate of workers’ true hours preferences at the going wage rate, relative to the hours 
actually supplied.   
  
We also use the EULFS microdata to estimate aggregate employment, unemployment, and 
average hours of work.  All of these statistics are converted to national aggregates using 
weights supplied with the EULFS.  We include the employed, self-employed, family 
workers, and those on government schemes when calculating total employment and 
average working hours.  Together these calculations provide all five of the components 
necessary to calculate our underemployment rate.  
  
Note that unemployment rates peaked in most countries around 2013.  They were 
especially high in Greece and Spain, where they reached over 25%.  The unemployment 
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rate peaked between 15% and 20% in Estonia; Ireland; Croatia; Cyprus: Latvia; Lithuania 
and Portugal.  In the UK it peaked at 8.1% compared with 9.6% in the United States.  
Poland which had seen an unemployment rate of 20% in 2002 saw a steady fall in its rate 
after its accession to the EU in 2004.  Other Accession countries – both the A8 that joined 
in 2004 and the A2 that joined in 2007 – saw much lower unemployment rates in 2017 than 
prior to the Great Recession.7  By 2017 over 2.65 million from the A8 and around one 
million from the A2 had registered to work in the UK.8  According to the OECD the annual 
unemployment rate peaked in Canada at 8.4% in 2009 and at 6.1% in Australia in both 
2014 and 2015 at 6.4% in New Zealand in 2012  and at 3.7% in Japan in 2010, which is 
the same level it reached in 2016 and 2017.  
  
Table 2a reports the underemployment rates derived using Equation 2 which we calculate 
for each of the twenty-six countries.  There is data available for the years 1998-2000 but it 
is unreliable and missing for many countries in these years hence we restrict ourselves to 
reporting data from 2001-2016.  In the case of the UK, we use the UKLFS to construct 
underemployment estimates because the EULFS data file does not contain data on those 
who express a wish to cut their hours.  In 2016 eleven of the twenty-six countries had 
double digit underemployment rates.   
 
Table 2b shows that underemployment rates were mostly higher than the equivalent 
unemployment rates, and especially so in recent years.9  Overall the underemployment rate 
in 2016 was above the Eurostat unemployment rate in twenty-three of the twenty-six 
countries.  The exceptions are Switzerland, Latvia and Luxembourg.  There are several 
countries in the pre-recession years where the underemployment rate was below the 
unemployment rate including principally the UK and Switzerland but also in one or more 
years in Austria, Croatia; Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Italy and Romania.   
 
Germany is of particular note.  It experienced a steady decline in the underemployment 
rate over time from 2004.  Switzerland had a negative rate in all years showing workers on 
the net wanted fewer hours.  In almost every other case the rate rose through around 2012 
or so and then fell back.  This category included Belgium; Denmark; Spain; France; 
Greece; Ireland; the Netherlands; Portugal; Sweden; Cyprus; Estonia; Croatia; Hungary; 
Iceland; Lithuania; Malta; Poland and the UK.  In a couple of other countries, the drop 
came later, for example both Finland and Romania did not see a decline until 2016.  Austria 
and Norway saw steady rises from 2011 and 2012 onwards.  Luxembourg’s rate reached a 
peak in 2008.   
 
                                                 
7  The A8 are Czech Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic.  The A2 are Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
8 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/national-insurance-number-allocations-to-adult-overseas-
nationals-to-december-2017  
 
9 We report the unemployment rate that we calculate in the online Appendix and how it differs from the 
official unemployment rates reported by Eurostat.  We also report the involuntary part-time rate calculated 
from our data.    
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Tables 3a (and 3b) detail how we constructed the underemployment rate, reporting 
aggregate desired additional (fewer) hours.  Table 3a reports on the millions of hours 
desired by those who say they want more hours while Table 3b does the same for workers 
who want less hours.  These data are used to calculate the underemployment rate in Table 
2.  To complete our index, we add the hours that the unemployed are predicted to work to 
both the numerator and denominator of (2).  To provide these estimates, we regressed usual 
hours on age, age squared, gender, education, year and country using the EULFS and then 
predicted average hours for the unemployed based on their characteristics.  The averages 
of predicted hours for the unemployed and the usual hours worked by the employed turn 
out to differ by less than 0.1 hours.  With the qualification that these results cannot account 
for differences in unobserved individual characteristics between the employed and 
unemployed, we have opted to use the average hours of the employed to estimate average 
hours of the unemployed in forming our index. 
 
Note that aggregate desired additional hours in 2016 in Table 3a were higher than in 2008 
in the majority of countries, with the notable exceptions of Switzerland, Estonia, Finland 
and Greece.  Aggregate desired hours reductions were mostly smaller, in absolute terms, 
in Table 3b in 2016 versus 2008 in the majority of countries with the exception of 
Switzerland, Denmark, Estonia, France, Portugal, Sweden, the UK and Luxembourg.   
  
Table 4 decomposes the net variation in aggregate desired hours between countries into 
components from voluntary and involuntary part-timers, and full-timers.  It is clear from 
the table that the IPTR is a biased estimator of the extent of labor market slack in the period 
after the Great Recession.  The extent of the bias will move over the business cycle and 
remains uncertain - the United States that does not have such data, but it does seem there 
are consistent time series patterns across countries.  As the recession hit all three groups of 
workers – involuntary and voluntary part-timers were more likely to say they would like 
more hours.  The table does show also considerable variation across countries which means 
it isn't simple to work out for the US, which does not have continuous desired hours data.  
This seems a major omission as we show below.  We show below that the IPTR plays a 
hugely significant role in wage determination in the United States.    
  
Chart 2 for the UK updates the chart in Bell and Blanchflower (2018b) to Q12018 and 
shows how the quarterly underemployment and unemployment rates have moved.  In the 
years before 2008 our underemployment rate was below the unemployment rate.  In the 
years after it the underemployment rate rose more than the unemployment rate and recently 
the gap has closed.  Chart 3 also for the UK shows why.  It plots the number of hours of 
those who say they want more hours and the number who say they want less at the going 
wage.  The latter series was broadly flat until recently but was always above the less hours 
series before 2008.  That suggests there is still a good deal of under-utilized resources in 
the labor market available to be used up before the UK reaches full-employment.  There 
has been a rise both in the number of hours of those who want more hours and those who 
want less in the post-recession years.  There is little evidence for other countries other than 
Switzerland that the underemployment rate was below the unemployment rate pre-
recession.  
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Our index allows for the possibility that not just involuntary part-time workers are 
underemployed.  Questions on desired hours are asked of voluntary part-timers and full-
timers as well as of involuntary part-timers.10  In general, full-timers wish to reduce their 
hours but both groups of part-timers would prefer more hours.  In the US we have no idea 
how much underemployment there is among voluntary part-timers or full-timers or how 
many additional hours involuntary part-timers would like to work at the going wage and 
how that changes over the cycle. 
  
Low Wage Growth and its Association with Underemployment  
This section establishes some key stylized facts for a range of labor markets before and 
after the Great Recession. Our first piece of evidence concerns low wage growth 
internationally.  Unfortunately we don’t have wage level data for the European countries 
in the EULFS data file. 
  
Nominal and real wage growth has been low around the world since the onset of the Great 
Recession.  We argue that a major explanation relates to the rise of underemployment 
which we associate with excess capacity at the intensive margin of the labor market. Large 
numbers of workers say they would like to increase their hours at current pay rates. Past 
debates have associated wage pressure with the extensive margin – the number of those 
without a job that are seeking work.  However, in our view, post-recession, 
underemployment is a more convincing explanation of the recent sluggishness of wage 
growth across countries. Underemployment has become a more convincing explanation of 
lower wage growth than unemployment.  
  
Even though the unemployment rate has returned to its pre-recession levels, 
underemployment in most countries has not.  Large numbers of part-time workers around 
the world – both those who choose to be part-time and those who are there involuntarily 
and would prefer a full-time job - report they want more hours.  Some full-timers say they 
want fewer hours, but many others seek to extend their working time.  When recession hit 
in 2008, in most countries, aggregate extra hours desired by those who wanted more hours, 
rose sharply and the there was some decline in the numbers seeking fewer hours.  We argue 
that underemployment – that still remains above pre-recession levels in most countries - 
exerts a downward pressure on wage growth, similarly to unemployment.  This is true using 
a variety of underemployment measures.  
  
Low wage growth is especially marked in Germany, the UK and the USA where the 
unemployment rate is currently 3.4%, 3.9% and 4.2% respectively.  In the years since the 
Great Recession, large numbers of jobs have been created, but the characteristics of the 
jobs on offer often do not meet workers' aspirations for working time.  Many are not offered 
as many hours as they would wish to work. 11   This underemployment is especially 
prevalent among the young and the less educated.  
                                                 
10 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=36324#  
 
11 In Germany, Canada and the UK, for example, the employment rate is now higher than it was at the start 
of the Great Recession.  In the United States the employment rate is three percentage points lower than it was 
at the start of the Great Recession even though employment is up. To get back to the starting employment 
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Even though the unemployment rate has returned to its pre-recession levels in a number of 
countries, the underemployment rate has not.  This is especially marked in the UK and the 
USA where the unemployment rate is close to 4%.  As we will show, in a number of 
countries, and especially in the Euro zone, which has an unemployment rate of 8.5% in 
March 2018, both the underemployment and unemployment rates remain above pre-
recession levels.  Examples of countries that still have elevated unemployment rates are 
France, Greece; Spain and Italy, all of which have unemployment rates of over 8%.  Labor 
market slack, we contend, continues to reduce wage pressure across advanced countries.    
  
The first two columns of Table 5 provide the latest comparable evidence from the OECD 
of nominal annual earnings changes, not adjusted for changes in prices for the thirty-five 
OECD member countries in the period prior to recession (2001-2007) and subsequently 
(2008-2016).  Nominal wage growth has been markedly lower since the Great Recession.  
For example, in the UK in the former period average nominal wage growth rates were 4.1% 
versus 1.7% in the later period; in the US they were 3.8% and 2.2% subsequently, while in 
France they were 3.0% and 1.7%.  Greece had averaged 5.7% pre-recession versus minus 
1.7% subsequently.  Japan saw a slight pick-up from -0.8% to -0.2% but still had falling 
wages.  Germany is the one major country with a major pick-up from an average of 1.6% 
wage growth to 2.3%.  Chile had the biggest rise from 4.9 to 7.0%, while Israelis had a rise 
of 1.8% in the early period and 2.3% in the. later one.  
  
The second two columns of Table 5 provide the latest comparable evidence from the OECD 
of real annual earnings changes for the same thirty-five countries in the period prior to 
recession and subsequently.  Data are presented in the last two columns averaging annual 
changes over the periods 2001-2007 and from 2008-2016 across thirty-five OECD 
countries.  In five countries real wage growth was higher in the second period than in the 
first.  First, Belgium, which saw a small rise from 0.1% to 0.3%, but was -1.0% in 2016.  
Second, Poland, Israel and Chile saw rises and especially so in 2016 for all three.  Third, 
Germany, that had seen low wage growth pre-recession has seen a steady pick-up post-
recession as the unemployment rate fell.  All of the remaining thirty countries saw lower 
real growth rate post-recession than pre-recession, with the difference especially marked 
in Greece (2.6% to -2.2%).    
  
The second piece of evidence establishes a considerable tightening of external labor 
markets post-recession.  For the third or fourth quarter of 2017 which are the most recent 
available at the time of writing 14/35 OECD countries had a quarterly unemployment rate 
below 5%.12    
                                                 
rate would require an additional 7.7 million jobs.  The employment to population rate in the US was 63.3% 
in February and March 2007 and 60.3% in April 2018.  Based on employment of 155,181 thousand, would 
require (155181*63.3/60.3)-155181=7.7 million jobs. 
12 The Czech Republic (2.8%); Germany (3.8%); Hungary (4.1%); Iceland (2.7%); Israel (4.1%); Japan 
(2.8%); South Korea (3.7%); Mexico (3.5%); Netherlands (4.7%); New Zealand (4.5%); Norway (4.0%); 
Poland (4.7%); UK (4.3%) and USA (4.1%).  In the European Union, the latest data at the time of writing for 
June 2018 show that eleven members have unemployment rates below 5% - Czech Republic (2.4%); 
Germany (3.4%); Hungary (3.6%); Poland (3.7%); Malta (3.9%); the Netherlands (3.9%); UK (4.1%); 
Romania (4.5%); Austria (4.7%); Bulgaria (4.8%) and Estonia (4.9%). 
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Japan has an unemployment rate of 2.4% and no significant wage growth.  For 2017, real 
wages fell 0.2 percent, following a 0.7 percent increase in the previous year.13  Nominal 
wage growth was 0.9% in 2014; 0% in 2015; 1.0% in 2016 and 0.5% in 2017.  Even the 
big car makers are only awarding low pay increases.  In 2018 Nissan granted an average 
increase of 2.4 per cent in monthly pay, Hitachi offered 2.3 per cent and Toshiba a raise of 
2.5 per cent.14    
  
In France, in 2016, the basic monthly wage grew by 1.2% as it did in 2015 and has not 
been over 2% since 2012.15  Hourly labor costs according to Eurostat, grew by 1.1% in 
France between 2016 and 2017, in enterprises with ten or more workers excluding 
agriculture and public administration.16  As Quevat and Vignolles (2018) note in relation 
to France "the rise in unemployment during the financial crisis of 2008-2009 clearly held 
back wage growth".  They show that the average wage per capita in France was 2% or 
lower in the years 2011-2016.  
  
There is no sign of any rapid wage acceleration in the UK or the US over the last two years 
despite the unemployment rate dropping to historical lows.  In the US average hourly 
earnings of private sector production and non-supervisory workers, that make up more than 
three17 quarters of the private sector workforce averaged 2.4% over the 24-month period 
from January 2016 through April 2018. It picked up to 2.6% in April 2018.  Weekly wage 
growth for these workers has accelerated a little faster to 2.9%.  The Federal Reserve's 
Beige Book for April 2018 reported that "most Districts reported wage growth as only 
modest."   
  
In the most recent data release for the UK by the Office of National Statistics the national 
statistic Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) total pay for the whole economy was £513 in 
each of the three months December 2017 through February 2018 and annual growth fell 
from 3.1% in December to 2.8% in January and most recently to 2.3% in February.18  It 
                                                 
 
13  http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/30/3002pe/3002pe.html  
 
14 Robin Harding and Kana Inagaki, ‘Japan wage increases fall short of Abe’s 3% target’, Financial Times, 
14th March 2018. 
 
15 https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2662658?sommaire=2662688&q=wages  
 
16  'Hourly labor costs ranged from €4.9 to €42.5 across the EU Member States in 2017', Eurostat, 9th April 
2018 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8791188/3-09042018-BP-EN.pdf/e4e0dcfe-9019-
4c74-a437-3592aa460623  
 
17 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/BeigeBook_20180418.pdf  
 
18  The last twelve annualized growth rates from June 2017 to May 2018 of Average Weekly Earnings (Total 
pay) in the UK based on single month averages were 2.8%: 1.7%; 2.4%; 2.8%; 2.4%; 2.4%; 3.1%; 2.8%; 
2.6%; 2.5%; 2.6% and 2.5% and 2.3% and the last twelve months from July 2017 to June 2018 for hourly 
earnings for production and non-supervisory in the US were; 2.2%; 2.3%; 2.6%; 2.2%; 2.3%; 2.4%; 2.4%; 
2.5%;  2.6%; 2.6%; 2.7% and 2.7%.  Weekly earnings growth was a little higher 2.5%; 2.6%; 2.6%; 2.5%; 
2.7%; 3.0%; 2.4%; 3.1%; 2.9%; 2.9%; 3.3% and 3.0%. 
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was also 2.3% in the private sector; 2.4% in Services; 2.3% in Manufacturing and 1.7% in 
Wholesale, Retailing, Hotels and Restaurants.  
  
Even in Germany where the unemployment rate is only 3.8% and underemployment is well 
below pre-recession levels, wage growth is weak.  According to the Federal Statistical 
Office DESTATIS, the change in gross hourly earnings for industry and services for 2017 
in Germany was only 2.2% on the previous year, down slightly from 2.3% in 2016.  
Earnings in Q42017 were up 1.9% while labor costs were up 1.5% compared with the same 
quarter a year earlier.19  Similarly, in the Netherlands, with an unemployment rate of 3.9% 
hourly wage growth in April 2018 in the private sector was 1.8%.20  Indeed, according to 
Statistics Netherlands annual private sector pay growth was below 2% in every month from 
January 2016 through April 2018.  
  
According to Eurostat, annual growth in labor costs rose at just 1.5% in the Euro Area and 
1.5% in Germany; 1.6% in France and -0.2% in Italy in Q42017.21  It is not a coincidence 
that inflation also remains low.  The latest data for July 2018 had HICP Inflation at 2.1% 
in the Euro Area and 1.4% excluding energy.  
 
Wages, Unemployment and Underemployment  
How far has labor market slack lowered wage growth?  As the economy approaches the 
NAIRU, wage growth is expected to increase, but there is little evidence of that happening 
in advanced countries in 2018.  That includes the US and Germany which both have 
unemployment rates below 4%, and the UK that is marginally above at 4.1%.  For a given 
unemployment rate, wage growth is less than it was before 2008.  We show that flat wage 
growth has more to do with high underemployment than lower unemployment.  We first 
establish that wages growth is flat in Germany, the US and the UK, which currently have 
historically low unemployment rates.  We then move on to estimate a series of wage growth 
equations.  
 
Conventional macroeconomic analysis of cyclical variations in labor market pressure have 
typically focused on the gap between the unemployment rate and the so-called “natural rate 
of unemployment”, the NAIRU.  This gap, as estimated, has turned out to be a poor 
predictor of wage pressure, mainly because the number of individuals currently seeking, 
and available, to work expressed as a share of the workforce cannot fully explain the 
outcome of the wage bargaining process, especially when the labor market is changing 
rapidly.  The estimates of the NAIRU have been much too high and continue to be.  For 
example, in the June 2013 Economic Outlook, No. 93, the OECD estimated the NAIRU 
for 2014 for the Euro Area as 10.1%; 6.3% for Germany; 6.9% in the UK and 6.1% in the 
                                                 
 
19 Statistisches Bundesamt 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/03/PE18_086_624.html 
 
20 https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/en/dataset/82838eng/table?ts=1525551349123  
 
21 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8752244/3-16032018-BP-EN.pdf/75ce8cea-0807-44ce-
a3df-521a5763b71b  
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USA.  The latest estimate of HICP inflation in the Euro Area was 1.4% with an 
unemployment rate of 8.5%.  NAIRU estimates continue to be revised downwards.    
  
The November 2017 Economic Outlook No. 102 estimate by the OECD for 2018 were 
markedly lower than they were just three years earlier.  NAIRU estimates were 4.7% 
(5.2%) for Germany 5.2% (5.9%) for the UK and 4.9% (5.0%) for the US, which all still 
look to high given little inflation or much wage growth.  The numbers in parentheses are 
the revised estimates for 2014 that the OECD made in 2017.  FOMC participants estimates 
of the NAIRU at their March 2018 meeting were in the interval 4.2% to 4.8%, despite the 
fact that there is little evidence of any pick up in wage growth, inflation is below target and 
the unemployment rate is 3.9%.22  
  
Chart 4 plots wage growth against the unemployment rate from 2012 Q1 through 2017 Q4 
for Germany, using data on labor costs from Springford (2018).23  It shows a very flat 
Phillips curve, with an R2 of only .002.  The data point to the bottom left shows that wage 
growth fell to 1.4% in 2017 Q4.  Assuming the same relationship exists in the data as 
unemployment fell say to 3%, the line of best fit (2.6726-.0534X) would predict actual 
wage growth of 2.7%.  We focus on the period post 2011 because the German 
unemployment rate was high pre-recession.  For example, the quarterly unemployment rate 
in Germany was 7.8% in 2008 Q1 and averaged 9.2% over the period 2000 Q1-2008 Q1.  
It fell below 6% in 2011 Q2 and, as is clear from the chart steadily declined from there.  
 
Chart 5 repeats the same exercise for the US, plotting hourly earnings growth of production 
and non-supervisory workers against the U3 unemployment rate, monthly from January 
2000 to December 2007.  The best-fit line has the equation 7.393 -.8224X.  Plugging into 
that the current unemployment rate of 3.9% predicts wage growth of 4.2%.   
   
Chart 6 uses the same US wage data but now uses the U7 underemployment rate.  Fitting 
a trend line to the data for the period January 2012 to July 2018 the best fit equation is 
(3.5217-.3002X).  If we plug in the July 2018 U7 rate of 2.9% into this equation it predicts 
wage growth of 2.65%.  If instead we used the lowest historical rate recorded for the 
measure – 2.3% that occurred in seven separate months in 2000 that predicts wage growth 
of 2.8%.   
 
In Bell and Blanchflower (2018a) we plotted Average Weekly Earnings (total pay) against 
the unemployment rate for the UK.  We reported that the function had flattened sharply 
over time.  The best fit equation for January 2012 through February 2018 using the same 
data is 4.209-.3941X, so a 4.2% unemployment rate currently operating also generates 
wage growth of 2.6%.    
  
Possible alternative causes for the lack of wage response include globalization, competition 
from migrant workers, movements of plants, contracts or subcontract to other countries.  It 
                                                 
22 https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14424.htm  
 
23 We thank John Springford for providing us with his data. 
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is amplified by weak unions, that have seen their membership decline around the world, 
which reduces workers’ bargaining power.  Underemployment may be partly caused by the 
weakness of worker bargaining power.  For the US, we find that it is less prevalent in the 
union than in the non-union sector, as is part-time employment.  Below we report the 
distribution of labor market status according to whether the worker was a union member 
or not using weighted data from the 2017 MORG files from the CPS.   
  
              Non-Union        Union  
FT Hours (35+), Usually FT   73.4 77.3  
PT for Economic Reasons, Usually FT  0.8 0.7  
PT for Non-Economic Reasons, Usually FT  5.6 7.9  
Not at Work, Usually FT  2.3 5.3  
PT Hours, Usually PT for Economic Reasons  2.7 1.4  
PT Hours, Usually PT for Non-Economic Reasons 13.7 6.5  
FT Hours, Usually PT for Economic Reasons  0.1 0.1  
FT Hours, Usually PT for Non-Economic  0.5 0.3  
Not at work, Usually Part-Time 1.0 0.6  
N =163,781 146,689         17,092  
  
It is apparent that a lower proportion of union members were part-time (22.7%) than is the 
case for non-union (26.6%) and the prevalence of part-time for economic reasons is nearly 
twice as prevalent in the non-union sector.  In part the problem in the US of using the 
measure of PTFER as an indicator of underemployment is that part-time employment itself 
is much less prevalent than it is in most other OECD countries.  According to the BLS in 
non-agricultural industries in June 2018 there were 155,659,000 workers of whom 
4,743,000 (3.0%) were part-time for economic reasons and 21,304,000 (13.7%) were part-
time for non-economic reasons.24  In total then part-time employment in the United States 
accounts for 16.7% of total employment.   
 
The OECD provides data on part-time employment as a percentage of total employment in 
2017 which is reported below.  The definition of what constitutes part-time employment 
has a lower threshold of 30 hours a week versus under 35 in the US so that estimate is 
biased upwards compared to the rest of the OECD.25  In the 2017 CPS MORG file 13.3% 
of workers said their usual hours were under 30 so we use that below.  The US proportion 
is well below that of all major advanced countries and only above Korea, Greece, Turkey, 
Portugal and seven East European countries. 
 
                                                 
24 Part-time refers to those who worked 1 to 34 hours during the survey reference week and excludes 
employed persons who were absent from their jobs for the entire week. 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t08.htm  
 
25 The OECD defines part-time employment as people in employment (whether employees or self-employed) 
who usually work less than 30 hours per week in their main job. Employed people are those aged 15 and over 
who report that they have worked in gainful employment for at least one hour in the previous week or who 
had a job but were absent from work during the reference week while having a formal job attachment.  
https://data.oecd.org/emp/part-time-employment-rate.htm  
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Netherlands 37.4   France 14.3 
Switzerland 26.7   Luxembourg 14.2 
Australia 25.7   Finland 14.0 
United Kingdom 23.5   Sweden 13.8 
Japan 22.4   Spain 13.8 
Germany 22.2   USA  13.3 
Ireland 22.0   Korea 11.4 
New Zealand 21.1   Greece 11.0 
Austria 20.9   Turkey 9.6 
Denmark 20.4   Slovenia 8.8 
Canada 19.1   Portugal 8.5 
Norway 18.8   Estonia 8.1 
Italy 18.5   Latvia 6.5 
Chile 17.6   Poland 6.1 
Mexico 17.2   Slovak Republic 5.8 
Iceland 17.1   Czech Republic 5.4 
Belgium 16.4  Hungary 3.6 
Israel 15.3   
 
The lower incidence of part-time work in the US may mean that simply using the 
proportion of workers who are PTFER may be a serious underestimate of 
underemployment in the US.  It would make sense for the BLS to include a question on 
worker's desired hours in its Current Population Survey given the importance of the 
involuntary part-time variable in the wage equations we have found.  It remains uncertain 
how much additional information would be obtained from being able to construct our 
measure, because in the analysis we performed the results from using our index are broadly 
similar to those using an involuntary part-time measure.  The extent of any bias is uncertain 
though given the rather different results by country in terms of the share of 
underemployment accounted for by the involuntary part-timers.  In the post Great 
Recession years since 2008 we show measures of underemployment replaces 
unemployment as the primary measure of labor market slack.   
 
a) Cross-country evidence   
Important recent work by Hong et al (2018) from the IMF across 30 countries has shown 
that the IPTR – expressed as a percent of total employment - enters significantly negative 
in wage change equations.  In the same equations the unemployment rate and the change 
in the unemployment rates are also significantly negative.  Across all countries, they find 
that on average, a 1 percentage point increase in the involuntary part-time employment 
share is associated with a 0.3 percentage point decline in nominal wage growth.     
   
Importantly Hong et al find that he effect is more pronounced in countries where the 
unemployment rate is below pre–Great Recession averages - Czech Republic, Germany, 
Japan, Israel, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom, and United States.  Within this group of 
countries, a 1 percentage point increase in the involuntary part-time employment share is 
associated with a 0.7 percentage point decline in wage growth.  The estimated effect is only 
0.2 percentage point for countries with unemployment appreciably above the pre–Great 
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Recession averages.  The authors conclude that "involuntary part-time employment 
appears to have weakened wage growth even in economies where headline unemployment 
rates are now at, or below, their averages in the years leading up to the recession."   
   
We are grateful to Hong et al (2018) for providing us with their data.  We then mapped 
onto it our underemployment rates for 19 of the countries in Table 3 and Table 4, making 
275 observations in all.26  We regressed the log of hourly pay from the Hong et al (2018) 
file on its lag and the log of the unemployment rate and the underemployment rate for the 
period 1998-2016 and then for the period 1998-2007 and 2008-2016.  We don't take logs 
for the underemployment rate as there are nineteen negative values mostly for Switzerland.  
Equations include full sets of year and country dummies.  The results were as follows – 
with t-statistics in parentheses.   
 
          1998-2016              1998-2007         2008-2016  
Lagged wage .9198 (70.9) .9447 (24.7) .7873 (20.2) 
  
Log unemployment rate -.0224 (2.3) -.0554 (2.7) -.0242 (1.4)  
Underemployment rate -.0025 (3.3) -.0041 (0.8) -.0036 (3.1)  
N 275 133 142   
 
In the whole period both the (log) unemployment rate and the underemployment rate are 
significantly negative.  In the later period the coefficient on the underemployment rate is 
significant while that on the unemployment rate is not while in the earlier period the reverse 
is true.  We find similar results below with the IPTR for the United States.   
 
b) United Kingdom 
In Bell and Blanchflower (2018b) we created a balanced panel of 20 regions by sixty-three 
quarters for the UK from 2002 to 2017 using data from the LFS.  Data are available on 
wages, hourly and weekly, since 2002 and we mapped these data onto a file that contains 
the unemployment rate as well as the logs of excess hours and over hours desired for 
workers, along with a few personal characteristics.  We then estimated a series of wage 
equations with the dependent variable the log of the wage, on a lag, wave and region 
dummies and personal characteristics along with unemployment and underemployment 
variables.   
 
There are 1260 observations in all (63 waves*20 regions) once we have calculated the 
lagged dependent variable and dropped missing observations.  With the dependent variable 
the log of hourly pay, we initially included the log of the unemployment rate which was 
insignificant.  We then added an underemployment measure, the log of the number of 
additional hours the underemployed would like.  This entered significantly negative and 
remains significant when the unemployment rate is dropped.  This variable performed 
better than the underemployment rate.  We found that the number of hours of those who 
                                                 
26 Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Latvia; 
Luxembourg; Malta; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  We mapped on some 
additional unemployment rates that were missing from the master file for Cyprus; Lithuania and Malta.  
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wanted more hours played no role in wage determination.  The results are the same using 
weekly wages.  The Phillips curve in the UK, we argue, has now to be rewritten into wage 
underemployment space.    
 
c) United States  
We explore the issue of underemployment reducing wage pressure further for the United 
States where we only have data on PTFER available.  The extent of any bias of not having 
continuous excess hours variables, remains unresolved.   
 
In Table 6 we report the result of estimating a series of log hourly wage equations on 
balanced US state year panels from 1980 through 2017, using state level data from the BLS 
matched by state and year to data from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) 
files of the Current Population Survey.  So, the number of observations is 1938 (50 states 
+ DC * 38 years).  We take the micro data in each year and collapse it to the state*year cell 
to calculate hourly wages as well as personal characteristics including schooling, age, race 
and gender.  We also calculate the proportion of workers who say they are part-time for 
economic reasons as a proportion of total employment by state (U7) from the MORG files 
from 1979 through 2002; after that we use the publicly available BLS data.  The personal 
controls are measured across all individuals while the wage data is calculated for 
employees only and part-time for economic reasons variables are calculated for all workers.  
We map that onto state level data by year from the BLS on the unemployment rate (U3) as 
well as data on U4 through U6, which are alternative measure of labor market slack, from 
2003 through 2017.27  We then calculate one-year lagged hourly wage variable for each 
state which means we lose the 1979 data.     
                                                 
27 The various measures are calculated as follows - the numbers refer to seasonally adjusted data for July 
2018.  Numbers in thousands as follows - labor force=162,245; employment=155,965; 
unemployment=6,280; PTFER=4,567; discouraged workers=512 and marginally attached (which includes 
discouraged workers) =1,498.  
U-3=Total unemployed, as a percent of the civilian labor force (official unemployment rate) = 6280 / 
(162245) =3.9%. 
U-4=Total unemployed plus discouraged workers, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus discouraged 
workers= (6280+512) / (162245+512) = 4.2%. 
U-5=Total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other persons marginally attached to the labor 
force, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force = 
(6280+1498) / (162245+1498) = 4.8% 
U-6=Total unemployed, plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force, plus total employed part time 
for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor 
force = (6280+1498+4567) / (162245+1498) = 7.5%. 
U7=PTFR/Employed=4567 / 155965=2.9%. 
U8=discouraged / (labor force + discouraged) = 512 / (162245+512) = 0.3% 
U9=marginally attached-discouraged / (labor force + marginally attached minus discouraged) = 1498-512 / 
(162295 + 1498-512) = 0.9% 
Persons marginally attached to the labor force are those who currently are neither working nor looking for 
work but indicate that they want and are available for a job and have looked for work sometime in the past 
12 months.  Discouraged workers, a subset of the marginally attached, have given a job-market related reason 
for not currently looking for work.  Persons employed part time for economic reasons are those who want 
and are available for full-time work but have had to settle for a part-time schedule. 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t15.htm  
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Our estimating equation is given by: 
 
 ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑈𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
 
where w is hourly earnings, U is one (or more) measures of labour market slack, X is a set 
of controls indexed by state and time, μ and ν are state and time fixed effects respectively 
and ε is a random error.  We use state level clustering to estimate standard errors and so to 
account for potential incorrect inference due to heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation.28 
We estimate wage curves with a lagged dependent variable, which in the first row is 
significantly less than one, which suggests it is not a Phillips curve.  This is the method 
used in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, 1995 and 2005) and Blanchflower and Levin 
(2015).    
   
Part A estimates hourly wage equation with a lagged dependent with all of the variables in 
logs.  In the first column we include the log of U3 – the unemployment rate - which enters 
significantly and negative with a coefficient of -.03.  The lag on the wage has a coefficient 
of .73, which as Card (1995) noted suggests what is being estimated is a wage curve not a 
Phillips curve, because the coefficient is significantly different from one.  The long-run 
unemployment elasticity of pay is estimated as -.10, calculated by setting Wt-1 to Wt and 
solving.  As the unemployment rate doubles, real wages fall by 10%, which is exactly the 
finding in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994).  It is a little higher than the finding of -.07 
found in a meta-analysis by Nijkamp and Poot (2005).  In the second column we estimate 
the same equation for the period 1980 to 2007 and find broadly similar results, with a long 
run unemployment elasticity also of -.10.  Then things change.   
   
The third column is restricted to the period since the onset of the Great Recession, 2008-
2017, which the NBER business cycle dating group categorized as starting in December 
2007.  Here we have 510 observations (10 years * 51 states including DC).  In this case the 
lagged wage is much lower than in the prior period dropping from .72 to .18 and now the 
logged unemployment rate is insignificant.  There is no wage curve in hourly 
wage/unemployment space.   
   
Column 4 for the entire period adds the log of the involuntary unemployment rate (U7), 
defined as the number of part-time for economic reasons as a proportion of the employed.29  
                                                 
28 For more on clustering when calculating state panel estimates see Bertrand et al (2004) and Stock and 
Watson (2008). 
 
29 Another possibility is to express the underemployment rate as a proportion of the labor force rather than 
of employment.  We decided to separate out the effects of unemployment (U3) and underemployment relative 
to employment (U7) as PTFER only applies to workers so we enter the underemployment and unemployment 
rates separately to work out their relative importance.  A further possibility would be to include the number 
of marginally attached workers in the denominator, but these data are only available by state from 2003.  The 
results are very similar whichever denominator we use.  For example, in column 7 of part B of Table 6 the 
coefficient on U7 when the denominator is employment is -.0235 (t=2.4), when the denominator is the labor 
force the coefficient is -.0212 (t=2.2) and -.0217 (t=2.2) if it is the labor force plus marginally attached 
workers.   
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That variable enters significantly negative and halves the coefficient on the unemployment 
rate as compared with column 1.   
   
Column 5 is for 2008 through 2017 and is broadly similar to the previous column where 
both the involuntary and unemployment rates are significantly negative.  Column 6 is for 
the post-recession period and only the involuntary part-time rate variable U7 is significant, 
and negative while the unemployment rate is not significant.  There is a wage curve in 
wage underemployment space but not in wage unemployment space with a wage 
underemployment elasticity of -.03.  The underemployment rate here measured as PTFER 
as a percent of total employment replaces the unemployment rate as the main measure of 
labor market slack in the US.    
   
In part B we experiment with alternative unemployment measures, which are available 
from the BLS by state from 2003-2017 and there are 765 observations (51 * 15 years).  In 
the first column we include the log of the U6 measure, which also enters negatively and 
significant for 2003-2017.  That gives a long-run wage unemployment elasticity of -.04.   
 
In the second column we include U7 which drives U6 to insignificance and is significant 
on its own in column 3.  It also gives a long-term wage underemployment elasticity of -
.04.  In the fourth column we include the log of U3 as well which is insignificant while the 
log of U7 remains significant and negative.  So, there is a wage curve in wage * 
underemployment space but not in wage * unemployment space.  The fourth column 
includes two further variables, in logs, we call U8 which identifies the discouraged worker 
rate, which is measured as discouraged / (labor force + discouraged), and U9 which 
identifies the number of marginally attached minus the number of discouraged workers, 
which is measured as marginally attached-discouraged / (labor force + marginally attached 
- discouraged).  The coefficients on both are insignificant in column 4.  The final four 
columns of part B are restricted to the post-recession period of 2008-2017 (n=510 – 10 
years * 51 states).  The underemployment measure U7 is always significantly negative.  
Discouraged worker and marginally attached worker rates are thus irrelevant in the wage 
determination process.   
   
Table 7 does the same as in Table 6 but this time for weekly wages and the results are very 
similar.  Here we find that the log unemployment rate remains significant in part A until 
the Involuntary PT variable U7 is added.   The long run wage/unemployment elasticity is 
in column 1 is estimated at -.12; -.11 in column 2 and -.06 in column 3.  Adding the 
significant and negative involuntary part-time variable in columns 4 through 6 removes the 
size of the coefficient on the log unemployment rate.  In part B the log U6 variable 
generates an elasticity of -.09 in column 1 but then becomes insignificant once U7 is 
included.  Including the U7 variable, in column 3 gives a wage underemployment elasticity 
of -.08.  For the later period in column 7 the elasticity is -.07.  Wage responses to labor 
market shocks in the later period are less than in pre-recession period and come through 
the underemployment rate whereas in the earlier period they come through both the 
unemployment rate and the underemployment rate. 
 
  23 
These results are entirely consistent with those reported in a new paper by Bracha and 
Burke (2018) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.  They find that hidden labor 
market slack in the form of informal ‘‘gig’’ economy work helps to explain the benign 
wage puzzle.  They argue that informal work represents additional labor market slack.  
They focus on informal work that is labor-intensive, in the Survey of Informal Work 
Participation for 2015–2016.  The SIWP is an annual module within the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York’s Survey of Consumer Expectations.  A respondent is defined as an 
informal worker if he or she (1) indicated working in at least one informal paid activity that 
is not survey work or renting/selling activities, and (2) reported strictly positive hours 
considering all activities except surveys and renting/selling.  According to this measure, 
19% of the individuals in their analysis sample (averaged over the three survey waves) are 
classified as informal workers.  They find that informal labor is negatively associated with 
wage growth at the census division level, while no such association exists between wage 
growth and unemployment rates, whether defined as U3 or U6.   
 
Table 8 builds on work by Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) and discussed in Blanchflower 
(2019) on the home ownership rate, which finds that a lagged home ownership rate was a 
significant predictor of unemployment rate.  A five-year lag on the home ownership rate 
enters positively into unemployment equations.  A higher home ownership rate in a state 
also lowered mobility.  It is notable that the home ownership rate has declined steadily 
from its peak in 2004.30  According to the Census Bureau home ownership rates reached a 
peak of 69.4% in the second quarter of 2004 and fell steadily through the second quarter 
of 2016 to 63.1% but have risen since then to 64.2% in the first quarter of 2018.  In the 
table, which is split into two parts, for hourly and weekly wages respectively, we examine 
the impact of changes in the home ownership rate impacts wage growth.  In the period 
1980-2007 annual change in the home ownership rate averaged +0.1% per annum.  In the 
years 2008-2017 it averaged -0.4%.  Every year from 2005-2016 was the change in home 
ownership was negative while in 2017 it turned positive again.  We report results separately 
again for hourly and weekly wages. 
 
In part A for hourly wages we include the log change in the home ownership rate, which 
enters significantly positive in columns 5 and 6 post-2008 but is insignificant in the pre-
recession years in columns 1-4.  A falling home ownership rate lowers wage pressure in 
the pre-recession years.  The involuntary part-time variable U7 are significant again and 
the unemployment rate, whether measured as U6 or U3 are not.  The results are very similar 
for weekly wages although there is evidence that the change in home ownership rate 
variable enters positively for the whole period 1980-2017 and for the pre- and post-
recession periods.  A rising home ownership rate pre-recession raises weekly wages in the 
                                                 
30 According to the Census Bureau annual home ownership rates – averaging across the seasonally adjusted 
four quarters were = 1980=65.6%; 1981=65.4; 1982=64.8; 1983=64.7; 1984=64.5; 1985=63.9; 1986=63.8; 
1987=64.0; 1988=63.8; 1989=63.9; 1990=64.0; 1991=64.1; 1992=64.2; 1993=64.0; 1994=64.0; 1995=64.8; 
1996=65.4; 1997=65.7; 1998=66.3; 1999=66.8; 2000=67.4; 2001=67.8; 2002=68.0; 2003=68.3; 2004=69.0; 
2005=68.9; 2006=68.8; 2007=68.2; 2008=67.8; 2009=67.4; 2010=66.9; 2011=66.1; 2012=65.5; 2013=65.2; 
2014=64.5; 2015=63.7; 2016=63.4; 2017=63.9. 
https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/histtabs.html  
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early period and a falling rate lowers them in the second.  So, falling home ownership in 
the post-recession years in the USA contributed to slowing wage growth. 
 
So, what? 
In the post-recession period underemployment has replaced unemployment as the main 
indicator of labor market slack.  Underemployment has not returned to its pre-recession 
level in many countries, whereas unemployment has.  In the past, at the low levels of the 
unemployment rate existing in countries like the US, Germany, the United states, speaking 
there was a pay norm of 4% in the years before the Great Recession and 2% subsequently.  
As a consequence, underemployment is pushing down on wages while the unemployment 
rate contains little or no information on wage pressure at such low levels in either the UK 
or the USA.  The unemployment rate is having no impact on wages after the Great 
Recession whereas it did before.    
   
Even though the unemployment rate is at historic lows in many countries this still does not 
suggest that these country's labor markets are anywhere close to full-employment.  In his 
1944 book Full Employment in a Free Society William Beveridge argued that 'full 
employment means that unemployment is reduced to short intervals of standing by, with 
the certainty that very soon one will be wanted in one's old job again or will be wanted in 
a new job that is within one's powers'.  (p.18).  In his 1960 prologue he wrote that "full 
employment means having more vacancies for workers than there are workers seeking 
vacancies.  It does not mean having no unemployment at all."  Full employment likely does 
not mean excessively high underemployment rates where workers are willing to work more 
hours at the going wage.   
 
Policymakers should not be focused on the unemployment rate in the years post-recession 
but rather on the underemployment rate.  Declining home ownership has also helped to 
contain wage growth.  We have shown there is a relatively flat wage curve in 
wage*underemployment space in the post-recession years in the United States but not one 
in wage*unemployment space.  This helps to explain the low wage growth as 
underemployment remains elevated.  Underemployment replaces unemployment as the 
main measure of labor market slack in the post-recession years. 
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Table 1.  Involuntary part-time rate as % total employment (ages 15-74) and the ILO unemployment rate. 
          Involuntary part-time %                                          ILO Unemployment rate %   
GEO/TIME 2008                        2012                      2016                      2008                      2012                      2016 
Austria 3.4 3.6 4.5 4.1 4.9 6.0 
Belgium 0.8 3.5 3.5 7.0 7.6 7.8 
Cyprus 2.0 5.3 9.0 3.7 11.9 13.0 
Denmark 2.4 3.3 4.9 3.4 7.5 6.2 
Estonia 0.7 1.7 1.3 5.5 10.0 6.8 
Finland 2.9 3.0 8.6 6.4 7.7 8.8 
France : : 6.2 7.4 9.8 10.1 
France (metropolitan) 4.8 5.2 6.1    
Germany 6.4 4.5 3.5 7.4 5.4 4.1 
Greece 2.1 5.1 7.3 7.8 24.5 23.6 
Hungary 0.2 2.2 1.1 7.8 11.0 5.1 
Ireland : 8.1 5.2 6.8 15.5 8.4 
Italy 1.7 2.6 3.2 6.7 10.7 11.7 
Latvia 2.2 5.0 3.5 7.7 15.0 9.6 
Lithuania 1.2 2.9 1.4 5.8 13.4 7.9 
Luxembourg 0.7 2.2 2.3 4.9 5.1 6.3 
Malta 1.9 2.4 1.8 6.0 6.3 4.7 
Netherlands 1.1 1.8 6.1 3.7 5.8 6.0 
Norway 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.5 3.2 4.7 
Poland 1.6 2.2 1.7 7.1 10.1 6.2 
Portugal 1.9 5.6 5.0 8.8 15.8 11.2 
Romania 2.3 2.5 2.5 5.6 6.8 5.9 
Slovakia 0.8 1.6 2.6 9.6 14.0 9.7 
Slovenia 1.4 2.0 3.1 4.4 8.9 8.0 
Spain 4.0 7.9 7.7 11.3 24.8 19.6 
Sweden 4.7 5.1 3.7 6.2 8.0 6.9 
United Kingdom 4.3 6.5 5.1 5.6 7.9 4.8 
Source: Eurostat.   
  30 
Table 2a.  Estimated Underemployment Rates from EU Labour Force Surveys   
 AT BE CH CY DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR          HU 
2001 2.8 7.7 -3.2 3.2   5.8 13.7 15.5 14.3   9.7  8.9 
2002 4.5 8.2 -1.5 2.6   5.4 10.4 15.5 13.4   9.0 18.7 7.6 
2003 4.6 9.3 -1.0 3.3   7.2 12.0 16.9 14.4 12.2 8.5 17.7 9.1 
2004 7.3 8.9 -0.9 3.6   7.3 10.0 15.4 13.0 13.3 8.9 16.3 8.3 
2005 5.9 10.4 -0.8 4.1 13.2 6.3 7.4 10.3 10.8 13.2 9.4 15.1 9.9 
2006 5.9 10.3 -1.4 3.9 12.9 6.1 4.6 9.2 12.6 13.8 8.8 13.6 10.3 
2007 5.9 9.7 -1.0 3.7 11.1 4.3 3.7 9.0 8.3 13.3 8.5 12.0 10.5 
2008 5.3 9.1 -2.0 6.4 10.1 4.4 5.7 13.0 8.6 12.8 8.4 10.2 10.2 
2009 7.7 10.1 -0.3 9.4 11.7 7.7 16.3 20.6 11.7 14.7 11.1 11.0 12.7 
2010 6.7 10.4 -2.6 10.0 10.4 9.1 18 22.6 11.3 14 13.9 13.8 13.7 
2011 6.1 9.7 -2.8 12.6 8.8 9.0 13.1 24.5 10.3 13.9 19.7 16.2 14.5 
2012 7.0 10.3 -2.0 17.4 8.0 9.3 11.7 28.7 10.7 14.7 27.1 18.3 16.2 
2013 7.5 11.1 -2.3 23.6 7.9 9.1 10.3 30.3 11.5 16.4 30.3 20.0 16.2 
2014 8.0 11.1 -1.6 24.9 7.2 8.9 9.5 28.5 12.2 16.6 29.8 20.3 13.5 
2015 8.7 11.1 -1.9 23.7 6.7 8.1 8.4 25.6 13.4 16.5 28.4 19.8 12.2 
2016 8.9 10.4 -2.2 20.2 5.8 7.0 7.4 22.7 11.9 15.7 26.8 15.7 9.1 
 IE IS IT LT LU MT NL NO PL PT RO    SE  UK 
2001 4.7 1.0 9.6 16.0 -1.3  5.6 4.7 18.1 6.0   12.9 4.5 
2002 5.6 2.8 9.9 12.6 0.1  6.0 5.1 20.2 7.6 9.0 12.2 4.4 
2003 6.1 5.3 9.6 13.7 4.3  6.9 6.1 20.9 10.5 7.8 14.2 4.1 
2004 6.3 4.8 7.8 11.1 5.1  8.4 6.1 20.3 8.4 7.6 14.5 4.0 
2005 5.8 2.2 7.9 8.8 5.1  5.5 6 19.3 10.2 8.2 11.4 4.7 
2006 6.0 2.5 6.9 6.3 6.7  5.9 3.7 15.1 10.5 8.3 11.3 5.3 
2007 5.6 1.6 6.2 4.2 5.8  4.8 3.2 10.6 11.1 7.3 10.7 5.1 
2008 8.7   7.1 5.4 6.8  3.5 3.3 8.2 11.2 6.8 10.6 7.0 
2009 17.3   8.6 14.3 3.0 11.9 4.7 4.5 9.7 12.7 8.3 13.6 8.9 
2010 19.0   9.3 18.7 1.3 13.2 5.3 4.6 11.2 13.7 8.8 12.6 9.1 
2011 20.4   9.2 16.4 2.1 13.2 5.5 4.4 11.5 21.2 8.5 12 9.7 
2012 20.8   12.1 14.6 1.7 13.1 6.8 4.2 12.9 24.7 8 12.5 9.5 
2013 19.2   13.6 13.0 3.0 12.9 9.0 5.2 13.9 25.1 8.2 12.8 8.5 
2014 16.9 9.1 14.2 12.1 2.5 12.6 8.8 5.0 12.3 22.8 8.4 12.9 6.8 
2015 14.6 7.5 13.3 10.1 1.5 12.2 8.2 6.0 10.0 20.4 8.5 12.3 5.8 
2016 12.3 6.1 13.0 8.4 3.3 9.6 6.4 6.4 8.0 19.2 7.2 10.8 5.2 
Key to Country Codes. AU=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; CY=Cyprus; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; EE=Estonia; ES=Spain; FI=Finland; FR=France; GR=Greece; 
HR=Croatia; HU=Hungary; IE=Ireland; IS=Iceland; IT=Italy; LT=Latvia; LU=Luxembourg ; MT=Malta; NL=Netherlands; NO=Norway; PL=Poland; PT=Portugal; RO=Romania; 
SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom 
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Table 2b.  Difference between Underemployment Rates and Eurostat Unemployment Rates 
 AT BE CH CY DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR             HU 
2001 -1.2 1.5 -5.7 -0.8  1.6 0.6 5.1 4.0      3.2 
2002 -0.4 1.3 -4.4 -0.7  1.1 0.4 4.3 3.0    3.6 2.0 
2003 -0.2 1.6 -5.1 -0.9  1.8 0.7 5.6 3.9  -0.9 3.7 3.3 
2004 1.5 1.5 -5.2 -0.8  2.1 -0.2 4.3 2.6  -1.4 2.6 2.5 
2005 0.3 1.9 -5.3 -1.2  1.5 -0.6 1.1 2.4 4.7 -0.6 2.4 2.7 
2006 0.6 2.0 -5.4 -0.7 2.6 2.2 -1.3 0.7 4.9 5.3 -0.2 2.4 2.8 
2007 1.0 2.2 -4.7 -0.2 2.4 0.5 -0.9 0.8 1.4 5.6 0.1 2.1 3.1 
2008 1.2 2.1 -5.4 2.7 2.6 1.0 0.2 1.7 2.2 5.7 0.6 1.6 2.4 
2009 2.4 2.2 -4.4 4.0 3.9 1.7 2.8 2.7 3.5 6.0 1.5 1.8 2.7 
2010 1.9 2.1 -7.4 3.7 3.4 1.6 1.3 2.7 2.9 5.1 1.2 2.1 2.5 
2011 1.5 2.5 -7.2 4.7 3.0 1.4 0.8 3.1 2.5 5.1 1.8 2.5 3.5 
2012 2.1 2.7 -6.5 5.5 2.6 1.8 1.7 3.9 3.0 5.3 2.6 2.3 5.2 
2013 2.1 2.7 -7.1 7.7 2.7 2.1 1.7 4.2 3.3 6.5 2.8 2.7 6.0 
2014 2.4 2.6 -6.5 8.8 2.2 2.3 2.1 4.0 3.5 6.3 3.3 3.0 5.8 
2015 3.0 2.6 -6.7 8.7 2.1 1.9 2.2 3.5 4.0 6.1 3.5 3.6 5.4 
2016 2.9 2.6 -7.2 7.2 1.7 0.8 0.6 3.1 3.1 5.6 3.2 2.6 4.0 
 
 IE IS IT LT LU MT NL NO PL PT RO    SE  UK 
2001 1.0 -0.9   -3.1  3.5 1.0 -0.3 2.1 -0.1 8.2 -0.2 
2002 1.4 -0.2 0.7 -1.2 -2.5  3.4 1.1 0.2 3.0 0.7 7.2 -0.6 
2003 1.6 1.3 0.7 1.6 0.6  3.3 1.9 1.5 4.3 0.9 8.6 -0.7 
2004 1.8 0.8 -0.1 -0.6 0.0  3.7 1.8 1.2 2.0 -0.1 7.8 -0.6 
2005 1.4 -0.3 0.2 -1.2 0.6  0.8 1.6 1.5 2.5 1.0 3.6 -0.1 
2006 1.6 -0.3 0.1 -0.7 2.0  2.0 0.3 1.2 2.7 1.0 4.2 -0.1 
2007 0.6 -0.7 0.1 -1.9 1.7  1.6 0.7 1.0 3.0 0.9 4.5 -0.2 
2008 1.9 0.1 0.4 -2.3 1.7  0.7 0.8 1.1 3.5 1.0 4.4 1.4 
2009 4.7   0.8 -3.2 -2.1 5.0 1.3 1.4 1.5 3.1 1.4 5.2 1.3 
2010 4.4   0.9 -0.8 -3.1 6.3 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.7 1.8 4.0 1.3 
2011 5.0   0.8 0.2 -2.8 6.8 0.5 1.2 1.8 8.3 1.3 4.2 1.6 
2012 5.3   1.4 -0.4 -3.4 6.8 1.0 1.1 2.8 8.9 1.2 4.5 1.6 
2013 5.4   1.4 1.1 -2.9 6.5 1.7 1.8 3.6 8.7 1.1 4.7 1.0 
2014 5.0 4.2 1.5 1.3 -3.4 6.8 1.4 1.5 3.3 8.7 1.6 4.9 0.7 
2015 4.7 3.5 1.4 0.2 -5.2 6.8 1.3 1.7 2.5 7.8 1.7 4.9 0.5 
2016 3.9 3.1 1.3 -1.2 -3.0 4.9 0.4 1.7 1.8 8.0 1.3 3.8 0.4 
Key to Country Codes. AU=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; CY=Cyprus; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; EE=Estonia; ES=Spain; FI=Finland; FR=France; GR=Greece; 
HR=Croatia; HU=Hungary; IE=Ireland; IS=Iceland; IT=Italy; LT=Latvia; LU=Luxembourg; MT=Malta; NL=Netherlands; NO=Norway; PL=Poland; PT=Portugal; RO=Romania; 
SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom 
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Table 3a.  Increase in weekly hours desired by those who want more hours (millions)   
 AT BE CH CY DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR            HU 
2001 2.6 2.9 7.5 0.6  2.1 1.4 40.2 9.2  8.1  10.0 
2002 1.2 2.5 8.5 0.7  1.2 1.1 33.8 8.8  8.3 3.0 8.1 
2003 1.2 2.8 7.7 0.8  2.2 1.1 45.5 9.2 53.7 8.2 3.2 10.2 
2004 2.2 2.9 7.7 0.9  2.5 0.9 39.1 8.2 58.7 8.0 2.0 9.5 
2005 8.3 3.5 7.5 0.7 34.8 1.9 0.6 24.8 7.0 61.0 8.0 1.8 8.7 
2006 8.9 3.7 7.6 0.7 41.9 2.8 0.6 24.0 9.2 68.1 8.5 1.8 8.3 
2007 9.5 4.0 8.8 0.7 39.2 6.9 0.5 23.2 7.5 73.0 8.8 1.6 8.7 
2008 9.6 3.8 8.3 0.9 91.8 7.1 0.7 28.1 7.4 73.1 9.7 1.3 7.2 
2009 11.1 3.9 8.8 1.1 99.8 6.8 1.3 33.8 7.7 73.3 11.1 1.4 7.1 
2010 10.8 3.9 7.1 1.0 90.3 6.2 1.0 33.3 7.2 69.7 9.8 1.7 7.0 
2011 10.3 4.6 7.3 1.1 82.3 5.9 0.9 35.7 7.0 67.9 10.3 1.9 8.3 
2012 11.0 4.9 7.7 1.2 78.0 6.0 1.1 41.7 7.5 69.2 11.5 1.7 10.8 
2013 11.0 5.0 7.7 1.6 75.0 6.2 1.2 43.4 7.6 85.3 11.7 2.0 12.3 
2014 11.3 4.8 8.5 1.8 70.4 6.1 1.3 41.2 7.9 83.8 12.5 2.2 12.3 
2015 12.0 4.8 8.4 1.7 66.9 5.7 1.3 36.8 8.0 82.2 13.0 2.7 11.8 
2016 12.3 4.7 8.2 1.5 63.4 8.2 1.1 33.4 7.7 77.8 12.7 1.9 9.9 
 
 IE  IS IT LT LU MT NL NO PL PT RO SE UK 
2001 1.3 0.4  2.3 0.1  21.8 0.9 37.3 7.4  18.6 24.7 
2002 1.7 0.4 6.2 2.1 0.1  22.4 0.9 38.3 8.9 19.0 17.2 24.5 
2003 1.8 0.3 7.2 2.4 0.2  20.6 1.5 40.4 10.9 18.2 19.3 24.7 
2004 2.3 0.2 14.9 1.9 0.2  23.2 1.6 38.2 6.7 13.9 18.0 24.0 
2005 2.4 0.2 11.4 1.8 0.2  16.8 1.4 37.3 7.3 14.9 14.5 24.6 
2006 2.5 0.2 11.2 1.7 0.3  19.7 4.7 36.6 7.9 13.5 15.2 26.8 
2007 2.1 0.2 10.4 1.5 0.3  20.1 4.8 34.7 8.7 12.6 15.7 28.0 
2008 2.8  12.0 1.2 0.3  20.7 5.2 33.6 9.6 12.4 15.6 30.0 
2009 4.8  13.0 1.4 0.4 0.4 21.9 5.3 34.7 8.6 12.8 16.6 36.2 
2010 4.5  12.5 1.4 0.3 0.5 19.3 4.9 33.9 7.8 12.8 15.1 39.6 
2011 5.0  11.6 1.4 0.3 0.5 17.9 4.9 33.9 19.5 11.8 15.4 40.9 
2012 5.4  16.3 1.5 0.4 0.6 19.0 5.2 40.3 20.5 11.4 16.1 43.1 
2013 5.6  16.6 1.5 0.4 0.5 21.5 5.8 44.2 19.7 10.6 16.9 43.8 
2014 5.1 0.5 18.0 1.5 0.5 0.6 20.8 5.3 41.9 20.3 11.4 17.3 44.4 
2015 4.8 0.4 17.3 1.4 0.5 0.6 21.4 5.6 36.4 18.2 11.3 17.4 42.0 
2016 4.3 0.4 16.7 1.3 0.5 0.5 19.8 5.5 33.0 18.4 9.7 15.7 39.7 
 
Key to Country Codes. AU=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; CY=Cyprus; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; EE=Estonia; ES=Spain; FI=Finland; FR=France; GR=Greece; 
HR=Croatia; HU=Hungary; IE=Ireland; IS=Iceland; IT=Italy; LT=Latvia; LU=Luxembourg; MT=Malta; NL=Netherlands; NO=Norway; PL=Poland; PT=Portugal; RO=Romania; 
SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom 
  33 
Table 3b.  Reduction in weekly hours desired by those who want fewer hours (millions)   
 AT BE CH CY DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR  HU 
2001 -4.4 -0.5 -15.6 -0.7  -0.4 -1.2 -3.2 -6.1  -10.3  -4.7 
2002 -1.7 -0.5 -14.7 -0.8  -0.1 -1.0 -1.5 -6.7  -11.2 -0.3 -4.8 
2003 -1.5 -0.2 -15.2 -0.9  -0.4 -1.0 -1.6 -6.1 -15.4 -11.2 -0.5 -4.7 
2004 0.0 -0.4 -15.3 -1.0  -0.4 -1.0 -4.3 -6.4 -15.4 -11.9 0.0 -5.4 
2005 -8.7 -0.2 -15.2 -0.9 -3.4 -0.5 -0.8 -16.3 -6.6 -13.4 -10.3 0.0 -4.0 
2006 -8.8 -0.2 -15.6 -0.8 -1.4 -0.5 -0.9 -19.2 -6.3 -15.3 -9.9 0.0 -3.4 
2007 -8.8 -0.1 -15.8 -0.8 -1.0 -6.8 -0.8 -18.5 -6.7 -15.6 -9.3 0.0 -3.4 
2008 -8.6 -0.1 -16.5 -0.4 -53.2 -6.5 -0.6 -13.7 -5.6 -15.4 -8.9 0.0 -3.3 
2009 -8.0 -0.1 -15.7 -0.4 -42.9 -5.4 -0.5 -9.5 -4.6 -14.9 -8.6 0.0 -2.8 
2010 -8.6 -0.1 -18.6 -0.4 -41.7 -4.9 -0.7 -9.0 -4.5 -15.7 -8.2 0.0 -2.8 
2011 -8.6 -0.1 -18.7 -0.3 -39.8 -5.0 -0.7 -8.3 -4.9 -15.8 -7.1 0.0 -2.5 
2012 -8.3 -0.1 -18.0 -0.3 -38.5 -4.7 -0.7 -7.1 -4.8 -13.7 -6.4 0.0 -2.1 
2013 -8.1 -0.1 -19.0 -0.3 -36.7 -4.7 -0.7 -6.9 -4.8 -16.4 -6.4 0.0 -2.1 
2014 -8.0 -0.1 -18.9 -0.3 -36.5 -4.4 -0.7 -6.2 -4.6 -16.8 -6.3 0.0 -2.1 
2015 -7.7 -0.1 -19.4 -0.3 -35.4 -4.3 -0.7 -6.4 -4.3 -15.9 -6.5 0.0 -2.2 
2016 -8.3 0.0 -20.1 -0.3 -37.4 -7.8 -0.9 -7.2 -5.0 -17.4 -6.6 0.0 -2.7 
 
 IE IS IT LT LU MT NL NO PL PT RO SE UK 
2001 -0.6 -0.4  -2.8 -0.3  -13.6 -0.1 -39.2 -3.2  -5.2 -31.2 
2002 -0.9 -0.4  -2.3 -0.3  -14.2 -0.1 -36.2 -2.6 -15.3 -5.4 -31.6 
2003 -0.8 -0.2  -1.8 -0.1  -12.8 -0.1 -30.0 -1.9 -14.7 -5.0 -32.6 
2004 -1.1 -0.2 -17.3 -1.7 -0.2  -14.3 -0.1 -29.5 -2.5 -14.7 -5.2 -32.1 
2005 -1.4 -0.2 -10.2 -1.5 -0.2  -15.3 -0.1 -26.5 -1.7 -10.9 -8.5 -30.4 
2006 -1.3 -0.2 -10.6 -1.4 -0.2  -17.2 -5.1 -27.8 -2.0 -9.4 -8.2 -29.9 
2007 -1.4 -0.2 -9.9 -1.5 -0.2  -17.7 -4.9 -28.1 -2.2 -8.9 -7.8 -30.8 
2008 -1.0 0.0 -8.8 -1.5 -0.2  -20.4 -5.3 -26.1 -2.0 -8.2 -8.0 -29.2 
2009 -0.7 0.0 -5.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.1 -20.3 -4.6 -24.0 -1.8 -7.0 -7.5 -27.2 
2010 -0.6 0.0 -4.4 -0.9 -0.6 -0.1 -17.9 -4.5 -22.7 -1.7 -6.0 -8.2 -28.8 
2011 -0.7 0.0 -3.9 -0.8 -0.6 -0.1 -17.0 -4.5 -21.0 -1.9 -6.7 -8.0 -27.5 
2012 -0.8 0.0 -3.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.1 -16.9 -4.8 -20.5 -1.6 -7.0 -8.0 -28.0 
2013 -1.0 0.0 -3.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.1 -17.6 -4.8 -19.0 -1.8 -6.7 -8.3 -28.2 
2014 -0.9 -0.2 -3.9 -0.7 -0.8 -0.1 -18.1 -4.5 -18.9 -2.1 -5.5 -8.4 -30.4 
2015 -0.8 -0.2 -4.2 -0.9 -1.1 -0.1 -18.3 -4.7 -18.9 -2.2 -5.1 -8.5 -32.0 
2016 -0.9 -0.2 -4.8 -1.0 -0.9 -0.1 -19.3 -4.3 -20.0 -2.2 -4.9 -8.5 -34.2 
Key to Country Codes. AU=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; CY=Cyprus; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; EE=Estonia; ES=Spain; FI=Finland; FR=France; GR=Greece; 
HR=Croatia; HU=Hungary; IE=Ireland; IS=Iceland; IT=Italy; LT=Latvia; LU=Luxembourg; MT=Malta; NL=Netherlands; NO=Norway; PL=Poland; PT=Portugal; RO=Romania; 
SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom 
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Table 4.  Share of excess hours (%)   
                                                    2008                                2012                       2016    
                            Voluntary    Involuntary   Full-time   Voluntary   Involuntary  Full-time     Voluntary.   Involuntary Full-time   
Austria 110 55 -65 75 27 -1 64 34 1 
Belgium 25 33 43 35 19 45 37 21 43 
Croatia 23 30 47 23 23 54 19 23 58 
Cyprus 8 21 71 7 30 63 6 45 50 
Denmark 77 45 -21 42 37 21 158 92 -151 
Estonia  58 38 4 27 17 56 73 27 0 
Finland 14 33 53 16 24 59 15 39 47 
France 11 21 68 13 23 64 12 27 61 
Germany 27 70 2 34 39 27 49 38 13 
Greece 36 115 -51 15 59 26 13 70 17 
Hungary 15 16 69 9 18 73 9 13 77 
Ireland 18 13 69 21 35 45 20 32 48 
Italy 22 152 -74 7 70 22 5 99 -4 
Latvia -93 -89 280 38 68 -6 50 94 -44 
Luxembourg 42 14 44 -29 -20 149 -36 -19 155 
Malta    10 9 81 6 16 79 
Netherlands 237 58 -195 138 62 -100 280 167 -347 
Norway -36 47 89 -17 38 79 -3 25 78 
Poland 40 38 22 16 23 60 19 27 54 
Portugal 8 23 69 10 21 69 11 20 70 
Romania 16 91 -7 13 95 -7 11 83 6 
Spain 24 74 2 9 74 17 10 91 -1 
Switzerland -8 -8 117  -3 -9  112  -1 -10 110 
UK  (2007) 38 22 41 31 37 32 37 32 31 
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Table 5.  Annual Average Wage Changes 2000-2016 (annual % changes)  
                                                       Nominal                                             Real   
  2000-2007     2008-2016                   2000-2007.     2008-2016  
Australia 4.2 2.9 1.3 0.6 
Austria 2.8 2.3 0.8 0.4 
Belgium 2.5 1.7 0.1 0.3 
Canada 3.5 2.6 1.7 1.2 
Chile 4.9 7.0 1.3 2.7 
Czech Republic 6.9 2.4 4.6 1.1 
Denmark 3.4 2.7 1.5 1.1 
Estonia 13.2 4.2 8.1 1.4 
Finland 3.4 2.4 1.8 0.5 
France 3.0 1.7 1.1 1.0 
Germany 1.6 2.3 0.2 1.1 
Greece 5.7 -1.7 2.6 -2.2 
Hungary 10.9 2.9 4.3 0.1 
Iceland 7.8 5.0 3.1 0.0 
Ireland 5.9 1.2 2.4 1.2 
Israel 1.8 2.3 0.2 0.5 
Italy 3.1 1.2 0.4 -0.1 
Japan -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
Korea 5.6 2.7 2.5 0.5 
Latvia 16.5 3.9 8.9 1.7 
Lithuania 9.8 4.0 8.2 1.3 
Luxembourg 3.8 1.8 1.4 0.7 
Mexico 7.8 3.6 2.3 -0.7 
Netherlands 3.5 1.8 1.0 0.7 
New Zealand 4.3 2.3 2.5 0.8 
Norway 4.7 3.6 2.8 1.3 
Poland 4.8 3.8 1.2 2.0 
Portugal 3.4 0.6 0.0 -0.4 
Slovak Republic 8.9 3.2 3.6 1.7 
Slovenia 8.0 2.1 3.0 0.9 
Spain 3.3 1.8 -0.1 0.7 
Sweden 3.5 2.7 2.2 1.3 
Switzerland 1.9 0.5 -1.0 0.6 
United Kingdom 4.1 1.7 2.7 -0.3 
United States 3.8 2.2 1.5 0.7 
   
Note: Average annual wages per full-time equivalent dependent employee are obtained by 
dividing the national-accounts-based total wage bill by the average number of employees 
in the total economy, which is then multiplied by the ratio of average usual weekly hours 
per full-time employee to average usually weekly hours for all employees.  Real wage 
growth is in constant 2016 prices NICU  For more details, see: 
www.oecd.org/employment/outlook       
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Table 6.  State level hourly wage equations with various measures of labor market slack, 1980-2017 with robust standard errors     
   
a) Unemployment rate and Involuntary part-time   
                                     1980-2017             1980-2007            2008-2017             1980-2017             1980-2007            2008-2017 
Log Wt-1 .7327 (30.36) .7196 (26.91) .1817 (3.17) .7242 (29.14) .7127 (26.61) .1646 (2.99) 
Log U3t -.0277 (5.57) -.0289 (4.48) -.0054 (0.51) -.0108 (1.99) -.0142 (2.20) .0110 (0.99) 
Log U7    -.0211 (3.24) -.0200 (2.69) -.0285 (2.74) 
 
N 1938  1428  510 1938 1428 510 
R2 within .9980 .9972 .9216 .9980 .9972  .9231 
R2 between .9523 .9491 .4198 .9598 .9532  .4354 
R2 overall .9971 .9960 .5365 .9972 .9961  .5443  
   
b) Using Alternative measures U6-U9   
                        2003-2017       2003-2017       2003-2017      2003-2017        2008-2017      2008-2017       2008-2017.      2008-2017 
Log Wt-1 .3328 (7.16) .3248 (7.10) .3255 (7.01) .3237 (7.13) .1784 (3.12) .1636 (2.97) .1677 (3.00) .1609 (2.97) 
Log U6t -.0257 (3.57)  .0088 (0.60)   -.0140 (1.07) .0273 (1.39) 
Log U3    -.0006 (0.06)    .0051 (0.48) 
Log U7t  -.0333 (2.98) -.0249 (4.73) -.0288 (3.90)  -.0408 (2.90) -.0233 (2.40) -.0308 (2.88) 
Log U8t    .0003 (0.09)    .0074 (2.06) 
Log U9t    .0050 (1.10)    .0015 (0.25) 
 
N 765 765 765 765 510 510 510 510 
R2 within .9712 .9713 .9712 .9713 .9219 .9234 .9229 .9238 
R2 between .7846 .7955 .7797 .7836 .3993 .4453 .3937 .4008 
R2 overall .8585 .8627 .8565 .8578  .5227 .5504 .5181 .5219 
Notes for Tables 6-8: All equations include a full set of year and state effects plus 21 personal controls - 15 education variables; age, 
gender and 4 race variables.  U3 is the unemployment rate.  U6 is the BLS broader measure of labor underutilization. U7 is PTFER as 
a percent of employment.  U8 is discouraged workers as a percent of (the civilian labor force + discouraged).  U9 is all marginally 
attached minus discouraged as a per cent of (the civilian labor force plus marginally attached minus discouraged).  T-statistics in 
parentheses. State alternative measures of labor utilization available at https://www.bls.gov/lau/stalt_archived.htm  
  37 
   
Table 7.  State Level Weekly Wage Equations with various measures of labor market slack, 1980-2017, with robust standard errors 
 
                                     1980-2017             1980-2007            2008-2017             1980-2017             1980-2007            2008-2017 
Log Wt-1 .7346 (30.36) .7263 (27.06) .3256 (5.84) .7137 (24.71) .7093 (26.06) .3031 (5.93) 
Log U3t -.0312 (7.47) -.0295 (6.62) -.0378 (2.81) -.0073(1.75) -.0070 (1.41) -.0144 (1.03) 
Log U7    -.0298 (6.38) -.0304 (5.96) -.0410 (3.32) 
 
N 1938  1428  510 1938 1428 510 
R2 within .9971 .9959 .9237 .9972 .9960  .9267 
R2 between .9518 .9576 .5553 .9646 .9633  .5986 
R2 overall .9927 .9898 .6412 .9937 .9906  .6684  
 
b) Using Alternative measures U6-U9   
                        2003-2017       2003-2017       2003-2017      2003-2017        2008-2017      2008-2017       2008-2017.      2008-2017 
Log Wt-1 .4701 (11.62) .4637 (11.83) .4641 (11.98) .4634 (11.90) .3107 (5.84) .3027 (5.94) .3036 (5.99) .3003 (5.76) 
Log U6t -.0490 (5.40)  -.0145 (0.90)   -.0550 (3.47) .0187 (0.74) 
Log U3    -.0106 (1.23)    -.0165 (1.34) 
Log U7t  -.0335 (2.94) -.0435 (6.49) -.0378 (4.98)  -.0358 (1.98) -.0478 (4.04) -.0425 (3.25) 
Log U8t    -.0002 (0.07)    .0056 (1.26) 
Log U9t    -.0010 (0.19)    -.0030 (0.47) 
 
N 765 765 765 765 510 510 510 510 
R2 within .9710 .9714 .9714 .9714 .9255 .9266 .9264 .9270 
R2 between .8791 .9014 .9071 .8995 .5594 .6179 .6587 .5986 
R2 overall .9135 .9249 .9280 .9240  .6433 .6809  .7069 .6683  
 
.
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Table 8.  Wages and change in the home ownership rate, with robust standard errors 
 
a) Hourly 
                                           1980-2017            1980-2017            1980-2007             1980-2007             2008-2017              2008-2017         
Log Wt-1  .6893 (26.43) .6880 (25.97) .6761 (23.51) .6743 (23.03) .1617 (2.92) .1656 (2.94)  
Log U7t -.0219 (3.06) -.0264 (4.66) -.0193 (2.19) -.0251 (3.20) -.0388 (2.79)  -.0218 (2.30)    
Log U3t -.0087 (1.37)   -.0119 (1.59)    
Log U6t     .0264 (1.36) 
Log Homet Log Homet-1 .0604 (1.57) .0613 (1.59) .0231 (0.45)  .0248 (0.48) .1349 (3.08) .1368 (3.16) 
 
N   1683 1683 1173 1173  510 510 
R2 within .9974 .9974 .9965 .9965 .9244 .9240 
R2 between .9414 .9492 .9183 .9291 .4156 .3667 
R2 overall .9957 .9959 .9941 .9944 .5313 .4999 
  
b) Weekly 
                                           1980-2017            1980-2017            1980-2007             1980-2007             2008-2017              2008-2017         
Log Wt-1  .6485 (17.13) .6467 (17.15) .6028 (12.91) .6025 (13.31) .3099 (6.09) .3107 (6.15)  
Log U7t -.0219 (3.06) -.0317 (6.84) -.0264 (4.71) -.0266 (5.39) -.0329 (1.83)  -.0218 (2.30)    
Log U3t -.0087 (1.37)   -.0005 (0.09)    
Log U6t     -.0200 (0.79) 
Log Homet Log Homet-1 .0604 (1.57) .1279 (3.61) .0231 (0.45)  .0991 (2.41) .1349 (3.08) .1728 (3.01) 
 
N   1683 1683 1173 1173  510 510 
R2 within .9961 .9960 .9939 .9939 .9282 .9280 
R2 between .9583 .9610 .9508 .9510 .6045 .6485 
R2 overall .9894 .9897 .9812 .9812 .6722 .7005 
 
  39 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Ju
l-
5
5
Ju
l-
5
6
Ju
l-
5
7
Ju
l-
5
8
Ju
l-
5
9
Ju
l-
6
0
Ju
l-
6
1
Ju
l-
6
2
Ju
l-
6
3
Ju
l-
6
4
Ju
l-
6
5
Ju
l-
6
6
Ju
l-
6
7
Ju
l-
6
8
Ju
l-
6
9
Ju
l-
7
0
Ju
l-
7
1
Ju
l-
7
2
Ju
l-
7
3
Ju
l-
7
4
Ju
l-
7
5
Ju
l-
7
6
Ju
l-
7
7
Ju
l-
7
8
Ju
l-
7
9
Ju
l-
8
0
Ju
l-
8
1
Ju
l-
8
2
Ju
l-
8
3
Ju
l-
8
4
Ju
l-
8
5
Ju
l-
8
6
Ju
l-
8
7
Ju
l-
8
8
Ju
l-
8
9
Ju
l-
9
0
Ju
l-
9
1
Ju
l-
9
2
Ju
l-
9
3
Ju
l-
9
4
Ju
l-
9
5
Ju
l-
9
6
Ju
l-
9
7
Ju
l-
9
8
Ju
l-
9
9
Ju
l-
0
0
Ju
l-
0
1
Ju
l-
0
2
Ju
l-
0
3
Ju
l-
0
4
Ju
l-
0
5
Ju
l-
0
6
Ju
l-
0
7
Ju
l-
0
8
Ju
l-
0
9
Ju
l-
1
0
Ju
l-
1
1
Ju
l-
1
2
Ju
l-
1
3
Ju
l-
1
4
Ju
l-
1
5
Ju
l-
1
6
Ju
l-
1
7
Ju
l-
1
8
Chart 1.  US Monthly Unemployment  (U3 and U6) and Underemployment Rates (U7), July 1955-
July 2018
U6 U7 U3
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Chart 2.  Unemployment and Underemployment Rates in the UK 2002Q2 - 2018Q1
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Chart 3.  More and Fewer Desired Hours in the UK 2001Q2 - 2018Q1
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Chart 4.  German Wage Growth and the Unemployment Rate, 2012Q1-2017Q4
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Chart 5.   US Annualized Hourly Earnings Growth by Month of Production and Non-Supervisory Workers and the 
U3 Unemployment Rate, January 2000 - December 2007
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Chart 6. US Annualized Hourly Earnings Growth by Month of Production and Non-Supervisory Workers 
and the U7 Underemployment Rate as % of Employment, January 2012 - July 2018
